MMRCA - FX Indiano

[AlbertoRJ]

No Plan to Buy F-35: Government


(Source: Financial Express (India); published June 23, 2011)



NEW DELHI --- India has officially put a full stop to the frantic US pressure to enter the $10.4-billion race for 126 Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA).

Reacting to media reports that the US may offer F-35 fighter jets to re-enter the MMRCA race, the official spokesperson in the ministry of defence (MoD), Sitanshu Kar, told FE that, “We have progressed a lot in the MMRCA programme, we have crossed a lot of stages that have become part of history.”

“It is too late in the day for any new entrant,” said a senior Indian Air Force (IAF) officer on condition of anonymity.

Industry sources, agreeing with the government’s decision not to allow any new entrant in the already closed race, said: “It is a very interesting situation. The trials are over. The commercial bids are expected to be opened shortly. Discussions on offset commissions are progressing well. While one government is offering its best machine, it will be India’s call finally.”

However, the source added that “it will be unfair to the shortlisted contenders”.

The government has shortlisted the European consortium Eurofighter’s Typhoon and the French Dassault’s Rafale fighter aircraft.

Lockheed Martin’s offering, the F-16IN, was eliminated from India’s [competition] along with rival Boeing’s F-18IN Super Hornet offering. The MMRCA deal was touted as the ‘mother of all defence deals’ in the international defence industry.

Though the Indian Air Force never seemed very interested in the F-16 Falcon from the US-based Lockheed Martin, one of the several reasons for the aircraft not being in the race could be the fact that fact that Pakistan also flies F-16s. Also Lockheed Martin could have run into problems in meeting the industrial offset provisions, given its lack of penetration in India.

India has been invited to F-35 events. With potential US order numbers dropping, India could have joined the elite programme. However, India chose to join hands with Russia for its Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA) programme, which offers a semi-indigenous alternative.

The F-35 jet is still in development and the planes would cost about $133 million each. The Pentagon plans to buy more than 2,400 of them, which means that at an estimated $382 billion, it is Pentagon’s most expensive weapons programme ever. A rough estimate has it that at $133 million per unit, the cost of acquisition for the MMRCA would go up by 50 per cent should the IAF opt for the F-35. This would inflate the $11-billion MMRCA tender to $17 billion.

-ends-
http://www.defense-aerospace.com/articl ... offer.html

[alexmabastos]

No Plan to Buy F-35: Government


(Source: Financial Express (India); published June 23, 2011)



NEW DELHI --- India has officially put a full stop to the frantic US pressure to enter the $10.4-billion race for 126 Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA).

Reacting to media reports that the US may offer F-35 fighter jets to re-enter the MMRCA race, the official spokesperson in the ministry of defence (MoD), Sitanshu Kar, told FE that, “We have progressed a lot in the MMRCA programme, we have crossed a lot of stages that have become part of history.”

“It is too late in the day for any new entrant,” said a senior Indian Air Force (IAF) officer on condition of anonymity.

Industry sources, agreeing with the government’s decision not to allow any new entrant in the already closed race, said: “It is a very interesting situation. The trials are over. The commercial bids are expected to be opened shortly. Discussions on offset commissions are progressing well. While one government is offering its best machine, it will be India’s call finally.”

However, the source added that “it will be unfair to the shortlisted contenders”.

The government has shortlisted the European consortium Eurofighter’s Typhoon and the French Dassault’s Rafale fighter aircraft.

Lockheed Martin’s offering, the F-16IN, was eliminated from India’s [competition] along with rival Boeing’s F-18IN Super Hornet offering. The MMRCA deal was touted as the ‘mother of all defence deals’ in the international defence industry.

Though the Indian Air Force never seemed very interested in the F-16 Falcon from the US-based Lockheed Martin, one of the several reasons for the aircraft not being in the race could be the fact that fact that Pakistan also flies F-16s. Also Lockheed Martin could have run into problems in meeting the industrial offset provisions, given its lack of penetration in India.

India has been invited to F-35 events. With potential US order numbers dropping, India could have joined the elite programme. However, India chose to join hands with Russia for its Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA) programme, which offers a semi-indigenous alternative.

The F-35 jet is still in development and the planes would cost about $133 million each. The Pentagon plans to buy more than 2,400 of them, which means that at an estimated $382 billion, it is Pentagon’s most expensive weapons programme ever. A rough estimate has it that at $133 million per unit, the cost of acquisition for the MMRCA would go up by 50 per cent should the IAF opt for the F-35. This would inflate the $11-billion MMRCA tender to $17 billion.

-ends-
http://www.defense-aerospace.com/articl ... offer.html

Não entendí isso aí...alguém entendeu?

Abs

[Carlos Mathias]

Ao optar pelo F-35, o custo do programa MMRCA subiria 50%, por baixo.

[knigh7]

Mas se passar o preco flyaway do Typhoon, para dólar, sai na faixa desse preco do F-35...essa moeda (Euro), que é cara, é fod@.

[Penguin]

http://livefist.blogspot.com/2011/07/re ... ction.html

[Penguin]

Ajai Shukla: Indo-US jet trainer - the Indus moment

Given US's technology safeguard regimes, joint development programmes can encompass high-technology equipment but not cutting-edge technology
Ajai Shukla / New Delhi June 28, 2011, 0:52 IST
http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/NEWS/news ... wsid=14967

The inherent buoyancy of the US-India relationship has again become evident from the US Congress’ recent attempt to jump-start flagging defence ties. Concerned over the drift, the pivotal Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) has asked the Pentagon to submit by November 1, 2011, a detailed assessment of the current state of US-India security co-operation; and a five-year plan for enhancing that. Noteworthy in itself is the bipartisan belief within the Committee that “it is in the national interest of the US, through military-to-military relations, arms sales, bilateral and multilateral joint exercises, and other means, to support India’s rise and build a strategic and military culture of cooperation and interoperability between our two countries, in particular with regard to the Indo-Pacific region”. But far more substantive is the SASC’s call on the Pentagon for “a detailed assessment of the desirability and feasibility… [of] a potential US partnership with India to co-develop one or more military weapon systems, including but not limited to the anticipated program to replace the US Air Force T-38 trainer jet”.

This is the first time that the US Congress has officially demanded a report from the Pentagon on the US-India security relationship. It raises the possibility that Congress might end up discussing the trickiest issues that dog US-India defence cooperation: viz. India’s wish for jointly developing military equipment rather than buying over-the-counter from the US; the tough US export control laws that stand in the way of joint development; and the building of trust through successful development programmes for high-technology platforms like the proposed trainer jet, which can only be named the Indus (given the rivers tradition set by the Indo-Russian cruise missile, the Brahmos, an amalgam of the Brahmaputra and the Moskva).

Both New Delhi and Washington understand that, given America’s technology safeguard regimes, joint development programmes can encompass high-technology equipment but not cutting-edge technology. The limits to what the US is prepared to pass on to India were signalled when Washington held back Boeing and Lockheed Martin from a contract floated by the Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA) – the Indian developers of the Tejas Light Combat Aircraft – for a development consultancy. That caused bad blood between the two countries and ADA eventually brought in European aerospace corporation, EADS, as consultants. Given that history, the proposal for a trainer aircraft as a joint US-India development project is a sensible one. A trainer is a high-technology platform, but it does not incorporate the cutting-edge aerospace technologies that set red lights flashing over a fighter development project.

Why then should India work with the US when Russia is willing to partner India in jointly developing a Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA), which incorporates not just cutting-edge but even bleeding-edge technologies? The fact, which top officials in the ministry of defence (MoD) ruefully admit in private, is that Russia will not pass on any key technologies to India. Sukhoi, the Russian partner in the FGFA project, has already developed the single-seat flying prototype that Moscow says meets the demands of the Russian Air Force. The work that remains mainly involves avionics and electronics systems and will fall largely into India’s share. The best that the Indian partner, Hindustan Aeronautics Limited, can hope to gain from this “joint development” is a level of expertise in project management.

Besides, the US is bound to gradually change its go-it-alone attitude towards developing weaponry. Facing an economic slowdown and expectations of a post-Afghanistan peace dividend, even the mightiest defence spender in the history of mankind will be required to share costs wherever possible. While US aerospace corporations could theoretically pick from a range of partners, working with India provides an assured market that is the largest outside China.

A US-India basic trainer would replace some 450 T-38s currently flying in the US Air Force. Add to that an assured market of at least 200 trainer aircraft in India and there is an excellent business case for partnering India in developing the T-38’s successor.

The SASC has hit a home run with its proposal, even though the US administration has not yet signalled any acceptance of joint development. Over the preceding years, Washington has wasted much political effort in fruitlessly persuading India to sign the three agreements that the US considers essential for enhanced defence cooperation: a Communications Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement; a Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geo-spatial Cooperation; and a Logistics Support Agreement. Though not needed immediately, all may eventually come about once Indian mistrust dissipates. The perception of drift was also enhanced by the Antony MoD’s way of doing business: entirely ignore contentious issues, effectively pretending that they do not exist. Finally, New Delhi appeared to have hit the US exactly where it hurts – i.e. in the pocketbook – by the unceremonious ejection of Boeing and Lockheed Martin from the $11 billion competition to sell India 126 medium multi-role combat aircraft.

All this had seemingly set back the relationship. Mid-ranking US bureaucrats were suggesting that India-related proposals would now be given far less attention. Visiting US officials were complaining about a “hesitation within the Indian MoD (Ministry of Defence) about working too closely with the US”. Washington’s apparent reneging on the terms of the US-India agreement on civil nuclear cooperation, by changing the rules on enrichment and reprocessing technology, has further dampened the mood. It is time for a game-changing initiative and Washington has been presented with the idea and the opportunity for a meaty joint development programme that, especially from India’s perspective, would add real meaning to the relationship.

[Jet Crash®]

http://livefist.blogspot.com/2011/07/re ... ction.html

Apenas mais um contrato indiano. Uma novela atrás da outra.

[Jonas Rafael]

Ajai Shukla: Indo-US jet trainer - the Indus moment

Given US's technology safeguard regimes, joint development programmes can encompass high-technology equipment but not cutting-edge technology
Ajai Shukla / New Delhi June 28, 2011, 0:52 IST
http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/NEWS/news ... wsid=14967

The inherent buoyancy of the US-India relationship has again become evident from the US Congress’ recent attempt to jump-start flagging defence ties. Concerned over the drift, the pivotal Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) has asked the Pentagon to submit by November 1, 2011, a detailed assessment of the current state of US-India security co-operation; and a five-year plan for enhancing that. Noteworthy in itself is the bipartisan belief within the Committee that “it is in the national interest of the US, through military-to-military relations, arms sales, bilateral and multilateral joint exercises, and other means, to support India’s rise and build a strategic and military culture of cooperation and interoperability between our two countries, in particular with regard to the Indo-Pacific region”. But far more substantive is the SASC’s call on the Pentagon for “a detailed assessment of the desirability and feasibility… [of] a potential US partnership with India to co-develop one or more military weapon systems, including but not limited to the anticipated program to replace the US Air Force T-38 trainer jet”.

This is the first time that the US Congress has officially demanded a report from the Pentagon on the US-India security relationship. It raises the possibility that Congress might end up discussing the trickiest issues that dog US-India defence cooperation: viz. India’s wish for jointly developing military equipment rather than buying over-the-counter from the US; the tough US export control laws that stand in the way of joint development; and the building of trust through successful development programmes for high-technology platforms like the proposed trainer jet, which can only be named the Indus (given the rivers tradition set by the Indo-Russian cruise missile, the Brahmos, an amalgam of the Brahmaputra and the Moskva).

Both New Delhi and Washington understand that, given America’s technology safeguard regimes, joint development programmes can encompass high-technology equipment but not cutting-edge technology. The limits to what the US is prepared to pass on to India were signalled when Washington held back Boeing and Lockheed Martin from a contract floated by the Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA) – the Indian developers of the Tejas Light Combat Aircraft – for a development consultancy. That caused bad blood between the two countries and ADA eventually brought in European aerospace corporation, EADS, as consultants. Given that history, the proposal for a trainer aircraft as a joint US-India development project is a sensible one. A trainer is a high-technology platform, but it does not incorporate the cutting-edge aerospace technologies that set red lights flashing over a fighter development project.

Why then should India work with the US when Russia is willing to partner India in jointly developing a Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA), which incorporates not just cutting-edge but even bleeding-edge technologies? The fact, which top officials in the ministry of defence (MoD) ruefully admit in private, is that Russia will not pass on any key technologies to India. Sukhoi, the Russian partner in the FGFA project, has already developed the single-seat flying prototype that Moscow says meets the demands of the Russian Air Force. The work that remains mainly involves avionics and electronics systems and will fall largely into India’s share. The best that the Indian partner, Hindustan Aeronautics Limited, can hope to gain from this “joint development” is a level of expertise in project management.

Besides, the US is bound to gradually change its go-it-alone attitude towards developing weaponry. Facing an economic slowdown and expectations of a post-Afghanistan peace dividend, even the mightiest defence spender in the history of mankind will be required to share costs wherever possible. While US aerospace corporations could theoretically pick from a range of partners, working with India provides an assured market that is the largest outside China.

A US-India basic trainer would replace some 450 T-38s currently flying in the US Air Force. Add to that an assured market of at least 200 trainer aircraft in India and there is an excellent business case for partnering India in developing the T-38’s successor.

The SASC has hit a home run with its proposal, even though the US administration has not yet signalled any acceptance of joint development. Over the preceding years, Washington has wasted much political effort in fruitlessly persuading India to sign the three agreements that the US considers essential for enhanced defence cooperation: a Communications Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement; a Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geo-spatial Cooperation; and a Logistics Support Agreement. Though not needed immediately, all may eventually come about once Indian mistrust dissipates. The perception of drift was also enhanced by the Antony MoD’s way of doing business: entirely ignore contentious issues, effectively pretending that they do not exist. Finally, New Delhi appeared to have hit the US exactly where it hurts – i.e. in the pocketbook – by the unceremonious ejection of Boeing and Lockheed Martin from the $11 billion competition to sell India 126 medium multi-role combat aircraft.

All this had seemingly set back the relationship. Mid-ranking US bureaucrats were suggesting that India-related proposals would now be given far less attention. Visiting US officials were complaining about a “hesitation within the Indian MoD (Ministry of Defence) about working too closely with the US”. Washington’s apparent reneging on the terms of the US-India agreement on civil nuclear cooperation, by changing the rules on enrichment and reprocessing technology, has further dampened the mood. It is time for a game-changing initiative and Washington has been presented with the idea and the opportunity for a meaty joint development programme that, especially from India’s perspective, would add real meaning to the relationship.

Reparem que o T-38 é a versão do F-5 para treinamento. Se a FAB ouve... não duvidem de entrarmos nessa também...

[Justin Case]

Amigos,

Notícia sobre os motivos da eliminação do MiG-35 da competição indiana MMRCA:
http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/20 ... mmrca.html

Engines and radar to blame for MiG-35 failure in MMRCA contest
By Vladimir Karnozov
DATE:04/08/11
SOURCE:Flight International

Radar and engine performance shortcomings were to blame for the MiG-35 failing to make the shortlist in India's medium multi-role combat aircraft (MMRCA) contest.

The revelations are contained in feedback from India to Russia's arms export agency, Rosboronexport.

The MiG-35's radar, the Zhuk-MAE active electronically scanned array (AESA), from Russia's Phazotron, failed to achieve the required acquisition and tracking ranges. And its Klimov RD-33MK engines also fell short of the Indian performance criteria.

Speaking to the media on 3 August, Vladimir Barkovsky, chief of MiG's engineering centre, said: "The Klimov and Chernyshev [engine companies] briefed [India] at length about their capabilities and intentions to improve their offering, but unfortunately their arguments were not taken into account."

Despite this, the same RD-33MK met Indian navy requirements and powers the newly-built MiG-29K/KUB fighters being delivered to the service.

Barkovsky also defended the Zhuk-MAE AESA radar, pointing out that the prototype nature of the model fitted to the MiG-35 meant that it did not meet the tender specifications, particularly regarding range.

He said: "We told the tender committee that this particular unit is experimental, and that in future we will make a larger radar antenna [capable of being used at a longer range]."

Barkovsky pointed out that the Eurofighter Typhoon is yet to be fitted with a working AESA radar.

"While the Russians demonstrated their radar fitted to the real fighter and working, [Eurofighter] demonstrated their radar on a helicopter," he said.

"The positive outcome of the Indian tender is that we made a huge effort on the radar development and demonstrated what nobody expected of us, and thus surprised many, including some in our home country." Barkovsky added.

The company will continue the MiG-35 project, he said, and look for other export customers.

Abraços,

Justin

[P. K. Liulba]

Amigos,

Notícia sobre os motivos da eliminação do MiG-35 da competição indiana MMRCA:
http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/20 ... mmrca.html

Engines and radar to blame for MiG-35 failure in MMRCA contest
By Vladimir Karnozov
DATE:04/08/11
SOURCE:Flight International

Radar and engine performance shortcomings were to blame for the MiG-35 failing to make the shortlist in India's medium multi-role combat aircraft (MMRCA) contest.

The revelations are contained in feedback from India to Russia's arms export agency, Rosboronexport.

The MiG-35's radar, the Zhuk-MAE active electronically scanned array (AESA), from Russia's Phazotron, failed to achieve the required acquisition and tracking ranges. And its Klimov RD-33MK engines also fell short of the Indian performance criteria.

Speaking to the media on 3 August, Vladimir Barkovsky, chief of MiG's engineering centre, said: "The Klimov and Chernyshev [engine companies] briefed [India] at length about their capabilities and intentions to improve their offering, but unfortunately their arguments were not taken into account."

Despite this, the same RD-33MK met Indian navy requirements and powers the newly-built MiG-29K/KUB fighters being delivered to the service.

Barkovsky also defended the Zhuk-MAE AESA radar, pointing out that the prototype nature of the model fitted to the MiG-35 meant that it did not meet the tender specifications, particularly regarding range.

He said: "We told the tender committee that this particular unit is experimental, and that in future we will make a larger radar antenna [capable of being used at a longer range]."

Barkovsky pointed out that the Eurofighter Typhoon is yet to be fitted with a working AESA radar.

"While the Russians demonstrated their radar fitted to the real fighter and working, [Eurofighter] demonstrated their radar on a helicopter," he said.

"The positive outcome of the Indian tender is that we made a huge effort on the radar development and demonstrated what nobody expected of us, and thus surprised many, including some in our home country." Barkovsky added.

The company will continue the MiG-35 project, he said, and look for other export customers.

Abraços,

Justin

A matéria é justa, pois mostra a alegação do fabricante. Ele diz que avisou aos solicitantes que o radar era um protótipo, e que a versão de série teria uma antena maior, o que proporcionaria maior alcance. Ele segue criticando a escolha Typhoon que nem radar AESA tem, e que fez a demonstração em um helicóptero!

Observa-se, portanto, a necessidade de não melindrar os possíveis parceiros futuros: aos americanos, desculpas. Aos russos uma exclusão precoce, para não haver um problema acentuado com um parceiro de importantes programas (SU-30 e T-50)... Além disso, fica evidente a escolha do Rafale, haja vista, que nem radar AESA o Typhoon possui...

A escolha pela Índia jogará por terra os argumentos de baixa escala de produção do Rafale.
Melhor para nós.

[Pepê Rezende]

Amigos,

Notícia sobre os motivos da eliminação do MiG-35 da competição indiana MMRCA:
http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/20 ... mmrca.html

Engines and radar to blame for MiG-35 failure in MMRCA contest
By Vladimir Karnozov
DATE:04/08/11
SOURCE:Flight International

Radar and engine performance shortcomings were to blame for the MiG-35 failing to make the shortlist in India's medium multi-role combat aircraft (MMRCA) contest.

The revelations are contained in feedback from India to Russia's arms export agency, Rosboronexport.

The MiG-35's radar, the Zhuk-MAE active electronically scanned array (AESA), from Russia's Phazotron, failed to achieve the required acquisition and tracking ranges. And its Klimov RD-33MK engines also fell short of the Indian performance criteria.

Speaking to the media on 3 August, Vladimir Barkovsky, chief of MiG's engineering centre, said: "The Klimov and Chernyshev [engine companies] briefed [India] at length about their capabilities and intentions to improve their offering, but unfortunately their arguments were not taken into account."

Despite this, the same RD-33MK met Indian navy requirements and powers the newly-built MiG-29K/KUB fighters being delivered to the service.

Barkovsky also defended the Zhuk-MAE AESA radar, pointing out that the prototype nature of the model fitted to the MiG-35 meant that it did not meet the tender specifications, particularly regarding range.

He said: "We told the tender committee that this particular unit is experimental, and that in future we will make a larger radar antenna [capable of being used at a longer range]."

Barkovsky pointed out that the Eurofighter Typhoon is yet to be fitted with a working AESA radar.

"While the Russians demonstrated their radar fitted to the real fighter and working, [Eurofighter] demonstrated their radar on a helicopter," he said.

"The positive outcome of the Indian tender is that we made a huge effort on the radar development and demonstrated what nobody expected of us, and thus surprised many, including some in our home country." Barkovsky added.

The company will continue the MiG-35 project, he said, and look for other export customers.

Abraços,

Justin

Ou seja, apenas EUA e França apresentaram radares AESA funcionais, segundo os indianos...

[Pepê Rezende]

Ajai Shukla: Indo-US jet trainer - the Indus moment

Given US's technology safeguard regimes, joint development programmes can encompass high-technology equipment but not cutting-edge technology
Ajai Shukla / New Delhi June 28, 2011, 0:52 IST
http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/NEWS/news ... wsid=14967

The inherent buoyancy of the US-India relationship has again become evident from the US Congress’ recent attempt to jump-start flagging defence ties. Concerned over the drift, the pivotal Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) has asked the Pentagon to submit by November 1, 2011, a detailed assessment of the current state of US-India security co-operation; and a five-year plan for enhancing that. Noteworthy in itself is the bipartisan belief within the Committee that “it is in the national interest of the US, through military-to-military relations, arms sales, bilateral and multilateral joint exercises, and other means, to support India’s rise and build a strategic and military culture of cooperation and interoperability between our two countries, in particular with regard to the Indo-Pacific region”. But far more substantive is the SASC’s call on the Pentagon for “a detailed assessment of the desirability and feasibility… [of] a potential US partnership with India to co-develop one or more military weapon systems, including but not limited to the anticipated program to replace the US Air Force T-38 trainer jet”.

This is the first time that the US Congress has officially demanded a report from the Pentagon on the US-India security relationship. It raises the possibility that Congress might end up discussing the trickiest issues that dog US-India defence cooperation: viz. India’s wish for jointly developing military equipment rather than buying over-the-counter from the US; the tough US export control laws that stand in the way of joint development; and the building of trust through successful development programmes for high-technology platforms like the proposed trainer jet, which can only be named the Indus (given the rivers tradition set by the Indo-Russian cruise missile, the Brahmos, an amalgam of the Brahmaputra and the Moskva).

Both New Delhi and Washington understand that, given America’s technology safeguard regimes, joint development programmes can encompass high-technology equipment but not cutting-edge technology. The limits to what the US is prepared to pass on to India were signalled when Washington held back Boeing and Lockheed Martin from a contract floated by the Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA) – the Indian developers of the Tejas Light Combat Aircraft – for a development consultancy. That caused bad blood between the two countries and ADA eventually brought in European aerospace corporation, EADS, as consultants. Given that history, the proposal for a trainer aircraft as a joint US-India development project is a sensible one. A trainer is a high-technology platform, but it does not incorporate the cutting-edge aerospace technologies that set red lights flashing over a fighter development project.

Why then should India work with the US when Russia is willing to partner India in jointly developing a Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA), which incorporates not just cutting-edge but even bleeding-edge technologies? The fact, which top officials in the ministry of defence (MoD) ruefully admit in private, is that Russia will not pass on any key technologies to India. Sukhoi, the Russian partner in the FGFA project, has already developed the single-seat flying prototype that Moscow says meets the demands of the Russian Air Force. The work that remains mainly involves avionics and electronics systems and will fall largely into India’s share. The best that the Indian partner, Hindustan Aeronautics Limited, can hope to gain from this “joint development” is a level of expertise in project management.

Besides, the US is bound to gradually change its go-it-alone attitude towards developing weaponry. Facing an economic slowdown and expectations of a post-Afghanistan peace dividend, even the mightiest defence spender in the history of mankind will be required to share costs wherever possible. While US aerospace corporations could theoretically pick from a range of partners, working with India provides an assured market that is the largest outside China.

A US-India basic trainer would replace some 450 T-38s currently flying in the US Air Force. Add to that an assured market of at least 200 trainer aircraft in India and there is an excellent business case for partnering India in developing the T-38’s successor.

The SASC has hit a home run with its proposal, even though the US administration has not yet signalled any acceptance of joint development. Over the preceding years, Washington has wasted much political effort in fruitlessly persuading India to sign the three agreements that the US considers essential for enhanced defence cooperation: a Communications Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement; a Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geo-spatial Cooperation; and a Logistics Support Agreement. Though not needed immediately, all may eventually come about once Indian mistrust dissipates. The perception of drift was also enhanced by the Antony MoD’s way of doing business: entirely ignore contentious issues, effectively pretending that they do not exist. Finally, New Delhi appeared to have hit the US exactly where it hurts – i.e. in the pocketbook – by the unceremonious ejection of Boeing and Lockheed Martin from the $11 billion competition to sell India 126 medium multi-role combat aircraft.

All this had seemingly set back the relationship. Mid-ranking US bureaucrats were suggesting that India-related proposals would now be given far less attention. Visiting US officials were complaining about a “hesitation within the Indian MoD (Ministry of Defence) about working too closely with the US”. Washington’s apparent reneging on the terms of the US-India agreement on civil nuclear cooperation, by changing the rules on enrichment and reprocessing technology, has further dampened the mood. It is time for a game-changing initiative and Washington has been presented with the idea and the opportunity for a meaty joint development programme that, especially from India’s perspective, would add real meaning to the relationship.

Reparem que o T-38 é a versão do F-5 para treinamento. Se a FAB ouve... não duvidem de entrarmos nessa também...

Esse produto já existe. Chama-se T-50...

Abraços

Pepê

[Viktor Reznov]

Tá aí, pelo menos a Índia tem razão pra enrolar essa licitação, não é todo dia que se compra 120 caças.....

[Alitson]

Amigos,

Notícia sobre os motivos da eliminação do MiG-35 da competição indiana MMRCA:
http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/20 ... mmrca.html
Abraços,

Justin

Ou seja, apenas EUA e França apresentaram radares AESA funcionais, segundo os indianos...

França, radar AESA, operacional, aonde?

[P. K. Liulba]

Desenvolvimento completado meu caro.