Página 58 de 100
Sem querer ser chato, mas sendo...
Enviado: Sex Abr 29, 2011 8:46 am
por Pepê Rezende
Cantei que o caça francês estava entre os preferidos quando todos afirmavam que fora descartado, mas todos sabem que sou lobista da Dassault e que não tenho fontes junto aos indianos... Como vimos, deu Gripen NG na cabeça.
Abraços
Pepê
Re: MMRCA - FX Indiano
Enviado: Sex Abr 29, 2011 9:04 am
por brisa
Parabéns Pepê
Saberia dizer para quando as entregas? Porque parece que um dos requisitos do concurso é que a aeronave seja equipada com um radar AESA.
sds
Re: MMRCA - FX Indiano
Enviado: Sex Abr 29, 2011 9:07 am
por Jonas Rafael
Pepê Rezende escreveu:
A Suécia está nas mãos dos conservadores, que querem economizar a todo custo, mesmo que isso implique no desmonte de uma indústria de defesa fantástica e tradicional.
Guardadas as devidas proporções, lembra muito um certo país por aí. Economia a todo custo, até quando sai mais caro lá adiante...
Re: Sem querer ser chato, mas sendo...
Enviado: Sex Abr 29, 2011 9:14 am
por knigh7
Pepê Rezende escreveu:Cantei que o caça francês estava entre os preferidos quando todos afirmavam que fora descartado, mas todos sabem que sou lobista da Dassault e que não tenho fontes junto aos indianos... Como vimos, deu Gripen NG na cabeça.
Abraços
Pepê
Parabéns, Pepê
![[009]](./images/smilies/009.gif)
Re: MMRCA - FX Indiano
Enviado: Sex Abr 29, 2011 10:13 am
por crubens
Pepê Rezende escreveu:cb_lima escreveu:Exatamente... aqui vem a síndrome do F-20 e esse sempre foi um dos meus argumentos contra o NG desde o ínicio...
Sem o compromisso real e em quantidades do País de origem para um produto dessa importância, fica muito díficil o trabalho de convencer qualquer país a adotar essa idéia.
Enfim, em se confirmando essa história indiana os suecos perdem uma gigante oportunidade de tornar o NG uma realidade em números significativos já que nem eles podem bancar esses caças em grandes quantidades novos em folha, tendo aeronaves relativamente novas estocadas em cavernas tomando poeira e vendo o tempo passar (mais ou menos 100 aeronaves A/B).
É aguardar.
[]s
CB_Lima
Não estão armazenados em cavernas (a Suécia NÃO é famosa por suas altas montanhas), ficam em hangares protegidos e o número é bem menor. Os caças arrendados para a República Checa e a Hungria e os vendidos para a Tailândia saíram do lote de 105 excedentes. Eles foram convertidos para padrões superiores (C/D) em um trabalho complicado, que implica na substituição completa da fuselagem. O mesmo ocorre com a frota da Flygvapnet. Um avião do estoque é convertido para o padrão superior e substitui um A/B operacional, que segue para o estoque. A frota também recebe UM Gripen C/D novo ao ano.
A Suécia está nas mãos dos conservadores, que querem economizar a todo custo, mesmo que isso implique no desmonte de uma indústria de defesa fantástica e tradicional. Aliás, hoje, boa parte está nas mãos da BAE System.
A Dassault já estuda comprar a SAAB caso o Gripen NG perca a concorrência no Brasil, uma probabilidade cada vez maior, para garantir o Neuron (muitos sistemas do UCAV europeu foram encomendados à empresa sueca).
Abraços
Pepê
Rapaz, se isso acontecer é melhor fechar a ponte pois a fila da torcida Gripen/SAAB vai ser grande.

Re: MMRCA - FX Indiano
Enviado: Sex Abr 29, 2011 10:30 am
por suntsé
Jonas Rafael escreveu:Pepê Rezende escreveu:
A Suécia está nas mãos dos conservadores, que querem economizar a todo custo, mesmo que isso implique no desmonte de uma indústria de defesa fantástica e tradicional.
Guardadas as devidas proporções, lembra muito um certo país por aí. Economia a todo custo, até quando sai mais caro lá adiante...
È lamentavel que existam pessoas assim, sem caráter e sem escrúpulos, que não se importam em destruir tudo que os antepassados contruiram com muito esforço.
È muito difícil para um país com a dimensão populacional e territorial como a Suécia ter uma indústria de defesa como eles tinham, Ai vem uma horda de conservadores responsáveis e destrói tudo...
Eu tenho a mentalidade de que dinheiro publico existe para fazer o País se desenvolver e crescer.....tornar o pais forte. Não entendo essa lógica do conservadorismo que quer economizar a custa da destruição da indústria local e do enfraquecimento do pais.
Re: MMRCA - FX Indiano
Enviado: Sex Abr 29, 2011 10:49 am
por soultrain
Bom, as coisas não são assim preto e branco. A verdade é que a Suécia está a sofrer há uns anos uma crise financeira grande, empresas como a SAAB, automóvel e de defesa, a ABB, a Ericsson, a Volvo etc passaram e passam por um mau bocado. Assim foi necessário cortar no superfulo, quem não tem dinheiro não tem vícios. Não se esquecem que a economia Sueca é da mesma ordem de grandeza que a Portuguesa por exemplo.
[[]]'s
Re: MMRCA - FX Indiano
Enviado: Sex Abr 29, 2011 11:03 am
por Quiron
Não creio que se trate de conservadorismo. Esses estados sociais custam verdadeiras fortunas e duvido que algum político tenha coragem de cortar os benefícios e receber uma pecha para o resto de sua vida. Portanto, vai-se a defesa embora, afinal é mais fácil de se justificar cortes nessa área, pois "de que servem esses gastos se não estamos em guerra?"
Re: MMRCA - FX Indiano
Enviado: Sex Abr 29, 2011 11:08 am
por Penguin
U.S. Industry Loses Big in India: Is ITAR to Blame?
(Source: National Defense Industry Association blog; posted April 28, 2011)
Defense contractors and industry experts are trying to come to grips with India’s decision to exclude The Boeing Co. and Lockheed Martin Corp. from its $11 billion competition for a new fighter jet.
No specific rationale has yet been given by the Indian government for its determination to jettison Boeing's F/A-18, Lockheed F-16 and Saab’s Gripen fighters, and proceed with a head-to-head contest only between two European offers — the Eurofighter and the Dassault Rafale.
“Companies are very concerned about the logic for the decision,” said a U.S. industry source. “There’s a bit of puzzlement.”
India's decision was very surprising, says Tom Captain, vice chairman of global and U.S. aerospace and defense leader at Deloitte LLP. If the selection was based on technical merits, "It is difficult to explain how those two very capable aircraft were eliminated."
In the absence of factual information about how the selection was made, speculation is growing that restrictive U.S. export policies may have played a significant role in India’s evaluation of fighter jet candidates. Analysts had predicted that at least one of the two U.S. contenders would have the inside track. U.S. technology is considered more advanced, and more coveted by rising powers such as India. President Obama also raised the stakes by personally making a pitch on behalf of U.S. industry to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh during his visit to India. He also sent Singh a letter reinforcing the importance of India’s fighter program to the Obama administration. India is expected to buy up to 200 new aircraft.
“We feel that our products are the best possible available,” said the industry source.”
India is projected to spend $80 billion on new weapons and space systems over the next five years. It’s only a small fraction of what the United States spends, but the industry still regards it as a promising region where, once you get a foot in the door, opportunities could blossom.
Defense industry analyst Byron Callan contends that “technology transfer was a major consideration in this competition.”
Callan presumes that the U.S. government was “unwilling to see key AESA [active electronically scanned array] radar and other avionics and electronic warfare technology made available at the level India wanted,” Callan writes in a memo to industry investors. “Technology transfer has also been a key consideration in Brazil’s FX fighter competition which has been delayed.”
One issue to watch as a result of this decision, says Callan, is “whether the U.S. further relaxes defense technology export restrictions in order to keep domestic production lines open.” This is a major concern for U.S. manufacturers as Pentagon spending begins to contract next year. In the past, Callan says, “when the U.S. restrained or reduced its defense spending, policy shifted to exporting advanced weapons to strategic partners.”
He notes that F/A-18 production “may still run through the end of this decade based on U.S. orders and from countries that had hoped for F-35s and who operate earlier-generation F/A-18s.” The longevity of the F-16, meanwhile, “hinges on its ability to win in niche markets in the Middle East, but it is less relevant to Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman (which makes the radar) with F-35 and the new bomber program ramping up.”
For Boeing, losing India’s sales is a big blow because it needs foreign sales to keep the F/A-18 line open beyond the coming decade, unlike Lockheed, which has a long-term lifeline in the multinational Joint Strike Fighter.
“It will be interesting to see what India does with combat fighter technology acquired from either Dassault or EADS and BAE Systems, and engine companies as well,” Callan writes.
Larry Christensen, an export controls attorney at Miller & Chevalier, in Washington, D.C., believes the Indian decision will have lasting implications for U.S. industry, even though he says he has not seen any proof that India’s choice was influenced by ITAR, the International Traffic in Arms Regulations that restrict exports of sensitive U.S. technology.
The fact that an emerging power such as India would snub U.S. advanced weaponry offers further evidence that the current export control system — which dates back to the Cold War — has outlived its effectiveness, Christensen says. “The U.S. government cannot repeal the laws of economics,” he says. As the United States denies access to some of its best technology, it leaves a market void that, sooner or later, another country will fill. “When that happens, the U.S. export control policy of denial, or policy of heavy restrictions, become ineffective” for the purposes of barring potential enemies access to advanced weaponry, he says.
It is conceivable that India concluded that U.S. restrictions on technology sharing are not worth the hassle, Christensen suggests. Although the United States wanted India to buy its fighter jets, it was “putting strings on those sales” that would have curtailed India’s ability to upgrade components, software or sensors, or collaborate with other countries, he says. If India had picked a U.S. aircraft, ITAR would have "restricted them in their ability to move forward with that platform.”
On a smaller scale, the same problem affects U.S. suppliers of less flashy products such as surveillance, law-enforcement and border protection technology, says Christensen. “I know small firms that feel the pain of commercial customers saying that they like the U.S. product but they can’t live with the restrictions and the overhead that goes with ITAR controls.”
The consequences for U.S. competitiveness are significant, he says. “The market is changing. Other countries are developing good technology.” The time has passed when only the U.S., U.K., France or Germany were viable supplies of advanced hardware, he adds. “Technology is now available from Russia, China and Israel, countries that are tend to place fewer restrictions” on transfers.
Christensen points out that the Obama administration is taking meaningful steps to reforming ITAR to boost U.S. industry. “I believe that there is significant movement,” he says. Hundreds of government officials currently are busy redrafting regulations,” he says. “It’s a long arduous task, and I’m glad they’re taking the time to do it right.”
Despite the Indian loss, U.S. arms are still hot sellers. The Pentagon is projecting arms sales to foreign buyers to exceed $46 billion in fiscal year 2011. Demand for U.S. weaponry is “higher than ever,” according to Richard A. Genaille Jr., deputy director of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. DSCA currently oversees a $330 billion portfolio of foreign military sales to 220 countries and international organizations.
At an industry conference in April, Genaille discussed efforts by the administration to increase foreign military sales as a means to court allies and boost Third World countries’ internal security. The goal is to revamp how the U.S. government manages international arms sales so it can be more “anticipatory” of future needs and more responsive to foreign allies’ requests.
The Obama administration, which regards weapon exports as a vehicle for bolstering the U.S. economy, believes that current methods for managing arms sales are too reactive, rather than proactive, he said. “It’s hard to be responsive when our system is geared to wait for a ‘letter of request’ from a country and then take action.”
-ends-
Re: MMRCA - FX Indiano
Enviado: Sex Abr 29, 2011 11:19 am
por Penguin
soultrain escreveu:Bom, as coisas não são assim preto e branco. A verdade é que a Suécia está a sofrer há uns anos uma crise financeira grande, empresas como a SAAB, automóvel e de defesa, a ABB, a Ericsson, a Volvo etc passaram e passam por um mau bocado. Assim foi necessário cortar no superfulo, quem não tem dinheiro não tem vícios. Não se esquecem que a economia Sueca é da mesma ordem de grandeza que a Portuguesa por exemplo.
[[]]'s
O dobro do PIB com população na mesma ordem de grandeza.
Em 2010 foi a economia que mais cresceu na UE (+5,54%).
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of ... pean_Union
[]s
Re: MMRCA - FX Indiano
Enviado: Sex Abr 29, 2011 11:24 am
por AlbertoRJ
Penguin escreveu:U.S. Industry Loses Big in India: Is ITAR to Blame?
(Source: National Defense Industry Association blog; posted April 28, 2011)
Defense contractors and industry experts are trying to come to grips with India’s decision to exclude The Boeing Co. and Lockheed Martin Corp. from its $11 billion competition for a new fighter jet.
No specific rationale has yet been given by the Indian government for its determination to jettison Boeing's F/A-18, Lockheed F-16 and Saab’s Gripen fighters, and proceed with a head-to-head contest only between two European offers — the Eurofighter and the Dassault Rafale.
“Companies are very concerned about the logic for the decision,” said a U.S. industry source. “There’s a bit of puzzlement.”
India's decision was very surprising, says Tom Captain, vice chairman of global and U.S. aerospace and defense leader at Deloitte LLP. If the selection was based on technical merits, "It is difficult to explain how those two very capable aircraft were eliminated."
In the absence of factual information about how the selection was made, speculation is growing that restrictive U.S. export policies may have played a significant role in India’s evaluation of fighter jet candidates. Analysts had predicted that at least one of the two U.S. contenders would have the inside track. U.S. technology is considered more advanced, and more coveted by rising powers such as India. President Obama also raised the stakes by personally making a pitch on behalf of U.S. industry to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh during his visit to India. He also sent Singh a letter reinforcing the importance of India’s fighter program to the Obama administration. India is expected to buy up to 200 new aircraft.
“We feel that our products are the best possible available,” said the industry source.”
India is projected to spend $80 billion on new weapons and space systems over the next five years. It’s only a small fraction of what the United States spends, but the industry still regards it as a promising region where, once you get a foot in the door, opportunities could blossom.
Defense industry analyst Byron Callan contends that “technology transfer was a major consideration in this competition.”
Callan presumes that the U.S. government was “unwilling to see key AESA [active electronically scanned array] radar and other avionics and electronic warfare technology made available at the level India wanted,” Callan writes in a memo to industry investors. “Technology transfer has also been a key consideration in Brazil’s FX fighter competition which has been delayed.”
One issue to watch as a result of this decision, says Callan, is “whether the U.S. further relaxes defense technology export restrictions in order to keep domestic production lines open.” This is a major concern for U.S. manufacturers as Pentagon spending begins to contract next year. In the past, Callan says, “when the U.S. restrained or reduced its defense spending, policy shifted to exporting advanced weapons to strategic partners.”
He notes that F/A-18 production “may still run through the end of this decade based on U.S. orders and from countries that had hoped for F-35s and who operate earlier-generation F/A-18s.” The longevity of the F-16, meanwhile, “hinges on its ability to win in niche markets in the Middle East, but it is less relevant to Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman (which makes the radar) with F-35 and the new bomber program ramping up.”
For Boeing, losing India’s sales is a big blow because it needs foreign sales to keep the F/A-18 line open beyond the coming decade, unlike Lockheed, which has a long-term lifeline in the multinational Joint Strike Fighter.
“It will be interesting to see what India does with combat fighter technology acquired from either Dassault or EADS and BAE Systems, and engine companies as well,” Callan writes.
Larry Christensen, an export controls attorney at Miller & Chevalier, in Washington, D.C., believes the Indian decision will have lasting implications for U.S. industry, even though he says he has not seen any proof that India’s choice was influenced by ITAR, the International Traffic in Arms Regulations that restrict exports of sensitive U.S. technology.
The fact that an emerging power such as India would snub U.S. advanced weaponry offers further evidence that the current export control system — which dates back to the Cold War — has outlived its effectiveness, Christensen says. “The U.S. government cannot repeal the laws of economics,” he says. As the United States denies access to some of its best technology, it leaves a market void that, sooner or later, another country will fill. “When that happens, the U.S. export control policy of denial, or policy of heavy restrictions, become ineffective” for the purposes of barring potential enemies access to advanced weaponry, he says.
It is conceivable that India concluded that U.S. restrictions on technology sharing are not worth the hassle, Christensen suggests. Although the United States wanted India to buy its fighter jets, it was “putting strings on those sales” that would have curtailed India’s ability to upgrade components, software or sensors, or collaborate with other countries, he says. If India had picked a U.S. aircraft, ITAR would have "restricted them in their ability to move forward with that platform.”
On a smaller scale, the same problem affects U.S. suppliers of less flashy products such as surveillance, law-enforcement and border protection technology, says Christensen. “I know small firms that feel the pain of commercial customers saying that they like the U.S. product but they can’t live with the restrictions and the overhead that goes with ITAR controls.”
The consequences for U.S. competitiveness are significant, he says. “The market is changing. Other countries are developing good technology.” The time has passed when only the U.S., U.K., France or Germany were viable supplies of advanced hardware, he adds. “Technology is now available from Russia, China and Israel, countries that are tend to place fewer restrictions” on transfers.
Christensen points out that the Obama administration is taking meaningful steps to reforming ITAR to boost U.S. industry. “I believe that there is significant movement,” he says. Hundreds of government officials currently are busy redrafting regulations,” he says. “It’s a long arduous task, and I’m glad they’re taking the time to do it right.”
Despite the Indian loss, U.S. arms are still hot sellers. The Pentagon is projecting arms sales to foreign buyers to exceed $46 billion in fiscal year 2011. Demand for U.S. weaponry is “higher than ever,” according to Richard A. Genaille Jr., deputy director of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. DSCA currently oversees a $330 billion portfolio of foreign military sales to 220 countries and international organizations.
At an industry conference in April, Genaille discussed efforts by the administration to increase foreign military sales as a means to court allies and boost Third World countries’ internal security. The goal is to revamp how the U.S. government manages international arms sales so it can be more “anticipatory” of future needs and more responsive to foreign allies’ requests.
The Obama administration, which regards weapon exports as a vehicle for bolstering the U.S. economy, believes that current methods for managing arms sales are too reactive, rather than proactive, he said. “It’s hard to be responsive when our system is geared to wait for a ‘letter of request’ from a country and then take action.”
-ends-
Não é por nada não mas muito do que vinhamos conversando nos últimos anos sobre o nosso FX se torna bem evidente nas (ou confirmado pelas) análises sobre a shortlist do MMRCA.
- O desempenho dos aviões, problemas com as restrições dos EUA, problemas com os riscos do programa Gripen NG, por exemplo.
[]'s
Re: MMRCA - FX Indiano
Enviado: Sex Abr 29, 2011 11:26 am
por soultrain
Penguin escreveu:soultrain escreveu:Bom, as coisas não são assim preto e branco. A verdade é que a Suécia está a sofrer há uns anos uma crise financeira grande, empresas como a SAAB, automóvel e de defesa, a ABB, a Ericsson, a Volvo etc passaram e passam por um mau bocado. Assim foi necessário cortar no superfulo, quem não tem dinheiro não tem vícios. Não se esquecem que a economia Sueca é da mesma ordem de grandeza que a Portuguesa por exemplo.
[[]]'s
O dobro do PIB com população na mesma ordem de grandeza.
Em 2010 foi a economia que mais cresceu na UE (+5,54%).
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of ... pean_Union
[]s
Já que vai na picuinhice, para ser o dobro eram precisos mais de 40.000 milhões de Euros, NÂO É O DOBRO, é na mesma ordem de grandeza, sabe o que quer dizer? Em 2010 a separação ronda os 100.000 M€...Já cansa...
Re: MMRCA - FX Indiano
Enviado: Sex Abr 29, 2011 11:36 am
por Carlos Mathias
um contrato que líderes e diplomatas norte-americanos disseram que determinaria a direção das relações estratégicas entre os dois países
Aqui faz toda a diferença a independência e a autodeterminação indiana diante de uma ameaça velada destas.
Agora, eu imagino o que andam fazendo/falando/ameaçando conosco, a nossa situação diante de uma escolha que não seja a americana.
Eu observo que,
primeiro eles conseguiram isso (independência), e só depois uns e outros foram lá babar saco deles.
Acho que fica a lição, no meu entender, que
primeiro se consegue independência, e
depois se consegue o respeito e a moral de "poder dizer não'.
Não vai ser com doses cavalares de vaselina que chegaremos lá, nem com nojinho de fazer o que se tem de fazer, mesmo desagradando ........
Aliás, até chegaremos, mas vai levar 330 anos.
Re: MMRCA - FX Indiano
Enviado: Sex Abr 29, 2011 12:22 pm
por Penguin
soultrain escreveu:
Já que vai na picuinhice, para ser o dobro eram precisos mais de 40.000 milhões de Euros, NÂO É O DOBRO, é na mesma ordem de grandeza, sabe o que quer dizer? Em 2010 a separação ronda os 100.000 M€...Já cansa...
A crise atinge toda a UE. De uma forma mais aguda em algumas economias e menos em outras.
Os indicadores econômicos da Suécia estão acima da média da UE. Na realidade estão entre os melhores da UE:
Estar fora da "zona do Euro" deve ajudar os suecos.
Mesmo assim, para uma economia do tamanho da sueca, é realmente complicado sustentar sozinha o projeto de um novo caça. A menos que isso se torne uma prioridade nacional como era durante a Guerra Fria.
[]s
OBS.:
Gross domestic product, current prices (USD)
Fonte:
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo ... 5&pr1.y=15
Portugal: 229bi
Suécia: 455bi
455/229= 1,98 ou seja quase o dobro.

Re: MMRCA - FX Indiano
Enviado: Sex Abr 29, 2011 12:27 pm
por Oziris
Cara eu fico impressionado com o Santiango!
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