UCRÂNIA

[gabriel219]

34 km² de avanço. Como há minas ao Norte de Toretsk, a SV tem dificuldades de manter os limites da cidade, pois há constante infiltração da ZSU através dos terrikons pelas minas. Nesse caso, me parece que estão fazendo uma pinça na região, o que abre total caminho pro Sul de Konstantinivka e as minas seriam excelentes plataformas logísticas.

The increasing frequency of Russian strikes on the Lvov and Rovno regions indicates a possible change in the approach to selecting targets. If earlier strikes on the western regions were episodic and, as a rule, concerned large logistics facilities (warehouses, communication hubs, energy supply infrastructure), now we are talking about consistent work on targets that were previously probably deliberately avoided - for reasons of resource conservation, political restraint, or due to operational irrelevance.

Against this background, the attack on the airfield in Dubno (Rovno region) stands out in particular. This facility was considered a couple of years ago as one of the possible locations for Western aviation, including F-16s, given its sufficient distance from the front line and proximity to logistics via Poland.

If the strike really did hit the airfield in Dubno, this indicates two things. First, a systematic cleansing of the infrastructure potentially used for the deployment of Western aviation has begun.

Secondly, the Russian side has confirmed data that either the deployment or preparation for the deployment of equipment and personnel is already being recorded at these sites.

It is also worth considering that the Geraniums and missile systems in this direction are being used with a density that was previously typical for strikes mainly in eastern and central Ukraine.

If the trend continues, the zone from Lvov to Lutsk and further west will begin to lose logistical and operational security, which will sharply complicate the integration of Western equipment and the coordination of its use.

E pra surpresa de zero pessoas, a Inteligência Britânica estava errada quanto as perdas Ucranianas se pegarmos o comentário do Rezident, Blogger Pró-Ucrânia:

Our source in the OP said that the Presidential Office will be forced to accept 6 thousand bodies of Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers and recognize them not as missing, but as dead. The payments are going to be spread out over several years, since families will have to be paid compensation of almost 90 billion hryvnia. Bankova does not want to introduce such a practice now, since the Russians may have up to 20 thousand bodies of Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers, and this is a serious psychological and financial instrument of pressure.

It is reported by other sources that Russia has 40,000 bodies.

Rezident

[Túlio]

Me parece que optaram mesmo pela decapitação: pelo jeito vão bombardear massivamente lugares ligados ao Cokenskyy para forçá-lo a se manter em movimento. Até lhe plotarem as coordenadas, daí...





Um golpe de mão particularmente notável seria se certificar de que ele usasse uma de suas rotas por países vizinhos para suas viagens internacionais e abater seu avião já perto da altitude de cruzeiro, mas ainda sobre o país hospedeiro. Seria uma lição a quem se mete em briga de cachorro grande e uma satisfação não só aos russos mas a todos os que possuem Forças Estratégicas e devem mantê-las visíveis aos satélites.

[FOXTROT]

Mais uma noite com fortes ataques em Kiev, diversas colunas de fumaça. AD ucraniana gastando o que não tem.

Saudações

[gabriel219]

[gabriel219]

[cabeça de martelo]

[FOXTROT]

Kiev amanheceu sob uma expeça cobertura de fumaça dos ataques russos, certamente um dos, se não o maior e mais destrutivo, em relação a noite anterior a AD foi muito menos efetiva, quer em abate, quer em lançamentos, até o fogo AAA foi pequeno. Isso mostra esgotamento da munição ou a destruição dos meios.

Mais um mês de ataques assim e o Zé ruela já pode ser deposto.

Saudações

[gabriel219]

Targets of the Overnight Strikes on Kiev Identified

The targets of the overnight strikes on Kiev reportedly included an armored vehicle plant, a shipyard, and an oil depot.
According to satellite imagery analysis by NASA and situational assessments from Ukraine's State Emergency Service, the strikes hit industrial, logistical, and infrastructure facilities.

One of the targets was the Kiev Armored Plant, where satellite images show a large fire. Some of the released footage from the plant's territory appears to have been blurred.
Another target was a facility belonging to Ukrrechflot — a shipyard with repair docks and warehouses in Kiev. A significant fire was reported in the area, near moored vessels that may have been carrying valuable cargo.
In addition, strikes hit a railway station and an oil depot in Boryspil. A major fire was recorded at the site. Preliminary reports suggest the station may have received a new shipment prior to the attack.
Reports also mentioned damage to the Artem plant.
It is worth noting that Kiev and its surrounding region were subjected to one of the most extensive drone attacks to date, involving "Geran" drones. Eyewitnesses shared footage showing thick black smoke rising over the city following explosions and fires.

Enquanto isso, a AFU:




Sério, parece inacreditável, derrubaram os dois Kh-22 usando um novo sistema antiaéreo: plataforma de petróleo abandonada. Tem Militar Brasileiro que usa Kiev como fonte oficial pra fazer tese no ECEME e ainda não tem nem vergonha na cara pra publicar isso online.

Eu entendo que precisa também vencer a Guerra de Propaganda, mas Kiev, BILD - jornal da BND, praticamente - e MI6 estão nível Índia/Paquistão.

[FOXTROT]

Passando para avisar que anoiteceu em Kiev, perigo de ursos!

Saudações

[gabriel219]

[gabriel219]

OSINT Resear cher Richard Vereker Updates Russian Tank Losses by Type

In a recent post (link), OSINT analyst Richard Vereker shared updated charts on Russian tank losses categorized by type.

Key Findings:

25% of all recorded losses are of unidentified tank types, significantly complicating statistical accuracy.
No T-90A or T-90S variants have been observed in the field — only T-90M.
Most likely nearly all T-90s have either been upgraded to the T-90M standard or destroyed. the initial pool of them in Russian Forces was not big to begin with.

The T-80 remains the most common Russian tank on the battlefield, though T-72 losses now slightly exceed those of the T-80.
Of all T-80 losses, 70% are the T-80BV (mod. 2022).
Likewise, 70% of all T-72 losses are T-72B3s (mod. 2022).
Older T-72s from 1989 continue to disappear from the battlefield, while losses of even older variants have slightly increased in proportion.
Losses of T-62s have dropped to 10% of total confirmed tank losses.

Russia has either exhausted its stock of T-62s suitable for refurbishment, or that it no longer sees value in reactivating remaining units due to cost-effectiveness concerns.

In general with respect to the T-62 I imagine that it no longer makes much sense in either of its 2 main roles in the past years.

1 - As an artillery weapon, acting relatively close to the line of contact for indirect fire missions.
The presence of drones basically prevents any system from acting so close to the line of contact for extended periods. In addition, the greater number of UAVs of various types, as well as a greater number of artillery systems on the Russian side makes their role unnecessary.

2 - As an assault tank it does not seem to be necessary either.
Right now, great advances are being made, using infantry tactics and speed-focused assaults, such as with motorbikes, rather than heavy assaults.

For reference, Russia's visually confirmed losses of armoured vehicles decreased by 43.9% from April to May, but their total advances in km² increased by ~92.9%. This highlights Russia's changing tactics and adaptation to the evolution of the war in Ukraine, while still increasing their rate of advance.

https://ukr.warspotting.net/

Segundo Warpointing, fonte Ocidental pró-ZSU, esses são os dados acima, utilizando imagens e geolocalização. Mesmo considerando fonte pró-Ucrânia, que não computa nenhuma perda do lado da ZSU, as informações acima contradizem - ou melhor, até apontam como falsas - as alegações do MI6 quanto a perdas x ganho de território.

Contudo, as causas também não é devido apenas a uma evolução das Forças Russas, mas uma fragilidade em crescimento exponencial da ZSU, tanto em MEM quanto em pessoal, o que indica que a fase da guerra de atrito, entre 2023-2024 - de certa forma se estende por 2025 - acabou sendo extremamente benéfico para os Russos, que conseguiram preparar melhor suas tropas enquanto a ZSU gastou recursos extremamente importantes em três erros estratégicos que estão se tornando catastróficos: Bakhmut, Ofensiva de 2023 e Kursk.

[gabriel219]

Ukrainian sources on the situation in southern Donetsk.

“The enemy has indeed almost reached the administrative border of the Dnipropetrovsk region.

The Russians advanced in the Novopavlovsk and Pokrovskoye directions.
They cannot be contained due to the total numerical superiority of the infantry and a number of other factors.

I am transmitting from the place:
"The main problems in this area are:

the absence of mining at all (anti-personnel and anti-tank);

lack of adequate cover (the targeted soldiers are yelling in the open field - these are practically the only cover), everything else is dug in between battles;

lack of normal fortifications - yagoza, entanglements, dragon teeth (because of this, motorcyclists and armor fly far into the rear)

The standard and favorite is interaction. There is not much of it (although we are working on it).

Adjuncts. They are objectively weak, they have many small units and almost no infantry, experienced UAV calculations (there are no landings where their concentration was very effective). They regularly lie that they have positions, but in fact they are not there (so our assaults were ambushed).

"We did not notice the destruction of enemy UAV crews. We saw several times how the Halls and Molniyas flew at an altitude of 200-300 meters without punishment."

Most of the problems have been voiced for several years now. But there are really no systemic changes in the army.
Even we have to deal with issues of establishing interaction from time to time, introducing divisions to each other. Just think about it!

You can also add the FPV shortage here.
Actually, the unit that provided the data turned to us for help.

We need a lot of drones there. Only death can stop the Russians.

Give it to the Russian cutter!”