Marinha dos EUA

[P44]

mais uns detalhes (USN)

BB Battleship
CA Heavy Cruiser
CAG Guided Missile Heavy Cruiser
CC Command Ship
CG Guided Missile Cruiser
CGN Guided Missile Cruiser (nuclear-powered)
CL Light Cruiser
CLAA Anti Aircraft Light Cruiser
CLG Guided Missile Light Cruiser
CV Aircraft Carrier
CVA Attack Aircraft Carrier
CVAN Attack Aircraft Carrier (nuclear-powered)
CVB Large Aircraft Carrier
CVE/ACV/AVG Escort Aircraft Carrier
CVL Light Carrier
CVN Aircraft Carrier (nuclear-powered)
CVS ASW Aircraft Carrier
CVT Training Aircraft Carrier
CVU Utility Aircraft Carrier
DD Destroyer
DE Destroyer Escort
DEG Guided Missile Escort Ship
DER Radar Picket Escort Ship
DDG Guided Missile Destroyer
DDR Radar Picket Destroyer
DL Frigate
DLG Guided Missile Frigate
DLGN Guided Missile Frigate (nuclear-powered)
DM Destroyer Minelayer
FF Frigate
FFG Guided Missile Frigate
FFR Radar Picket Frigate
FFT Reserve Training Frigate
IFS Inshore Fire Support Ship
LCC Amphibious Command Ship
LCU Utility Landing Craft
LFR Inshore Fire Support Ship
LHA Amphibious Assault Ship (general purpose)
LHD Amphibious Assault Ship (multi purpose)
LKA Amphibious Cargo Ship
LPA Amphibious Transport
LPD Amphibious Transport Dock
LPH/CVHA Amphibious Assault Ship (helicopter)
LPR Amphibious Transport (small)
LPSS Amphibious Transport Submarine
LSD Dock Landing Ship
LSM Medium Landing Ship
LSMR Medium Landing Ship (Rocket)
LST Tank Landing Ship
LSV Vehicle Landing Ship
MCM Mine Countermeasures Ship
MCS Mine Countermeasures Support Ship
MMF Fleet Minelayer
MSB Minesweeping Boats
MSC/MHC Minesweeper, Coastal
MSF Fleet Minesweeper
MSO Minesweeper, Oceanic
PC Patrol Coastal (old meaning: Submarine Chaser)
PCE Patrol Escort
PCER Rescue Escort
PCH Hydrofoil Submarine Chaser
PCS Submarine Chaser
PG Patrol Combatant
PGH Patrol Craft (hydrofoil)
PGM Motor Gunboat
PHM Patrol Combatant Missile (hydrofoil)
PTF Fast Patrol Craft

[Sniper]

Muito obrigado PAtton, JLRC e Prepe pelas explicações!

[Rui Elias Maltez]

Talharim:

Relativamente à sua pergunta, 2 páginas atrás, repare na sua lista de 1989 e na actual que o JLRC colocou:

Se reparar a Marinha norte-americana não perdeu força, antes a ganhou, já que a actuais plataformas têm muito maior poder de fogo, são mais modernas em todos os aspectos, ou seja, pode ter dimunuido no nº de unidades (nem me dei ao cuidado de contar ) mas aumentou muito na sua capacidade em termos de qualidade.

Po outro lado, em 1989, alguns dos navios que estavam na lista, já estavam na práctica parados ou na reserva naval inativa, ou seja, estavam na práctica acostados, como era o exemplo das fragatas Knox.

A grande tendência, se reparar nas duas listas é para uma maior uniformizaçao da frota (repare que cabaram os cruzadores nucleares, e que em termos de CVN passarão a contar apenas com 2 classes), e em termos de navios de linha os EUA agora praticamente contam apenas com os Ticonderoga e as Arleigh Burke.

E aumentaram e continuam apostados em aumentar a sua capacidade expedicionária através do programa de LPD's da classe San António, em que do LPD 17, já activo, até ao presente estão agora na construção já do LPD 22 que julgo que será o USS New York.

Ou seja:

Maior uniformização, maior capacidade expedicionária que em forças quer em poder, e maior sofisticação.

Portanto, para mim, hoje a marinha dos EUA não está mais fraca que em 1989.

[P44]

The new LHA 6 amphibious ships will be larger than the current LHA 1s (such as the USS USS Peleliu seen here) and will carry more aircraft and helicopters. (US Navy photo)

Pentagon Contract Announcement


(Source: US Department of Defense; issued June 1, 2007)

Northrop Grumman Ship Systems, Pascagoula, Miss., is being awarded a $2,400,000,000 fixed-price incentive modification to previously awarded contract (N00024-05-C-2221) for the detail design and construction of the LHA 6 Amphibious Assault Ship.

The LHA 6 will replace the LHA 1 Class Amphibious Assault Ships and will provide forward presence and power projection as an integral part of joint, inter-agency and multi-national maritime expeditionary forces.

It will launch tilt-rotors, helicopters, and fixed wing, short take-off vertical landing aircraft in support of amphibious operations.

The LHA 6 will be a variant of the LHD 8 Amphibious Assault Ship currently under construction by NGSS and will have enhanced aviation capabilities.

Work will be performed in Pascagoula, Miss. (95 percent) and New Orleans, La. (5 percent), and is expected to be completed by August 2012.Contract funds will not expire at the end of the current fiscal year.

The Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington, D.C., is the contracting activity. (ends)



U.S. Navy Awards Northrop Grumman $2.4 Billion Contract to Build New Amphibious Assault Ship LHA 6


(Source: Northrop Grumman; issued June 1, 2007)



PASCAGOULA, Miss. --- The U.S. Navy today awarded Northrop Grumman Corporation a $2.4 billion fixed-price incentive contract for the detail design and construction of the amphibious assault ship, LHA 6. Work will be performed primarily at the company's shipyard in Pascagoula, Miss., and ship delivery is scheduled for 2012.

"This contract award reinforces the U.S. Navy's confidence that we have recovered from the effects of Hurricane Katrina and are capable of meeting the warfighters' needs in a timely and cost effective manner," said Philip Teel, corporate vice president and president of Northrop Grumman's Ship Systems sector. "We are proud to have been the sole provider of these ships since USS Tarawa (LHA 1), commissioned in 1976.

"This contract is not only important to our employees, our company and our community but also to the sailors and U.S. Marines who will operate these ships in defending our nation's freedom," Teel continued.

"The workforce on the Gulf Coast has a proud history of success in building amphibious ships for the United States Navy. I am pleased that Mississippi continues to maintain its partnership with the Navy and Northrop Grumman in providing innovative and state-of-the-art vessels for the U.S. Marines defending our country," said U.S. Senator Thad Cochran of Mississippi.

"Geared around mobility and the need to quickly project naval power throughout the globe, the LHA program is essential for meeting 21st Century security threats," said U.S. Senator Trent Lott of Mississippi. "The program is a big part of our Gulf Coast's ongoing economic recovery as well. Since Hurricane Katrina, we've seen many national and international companies show confidence in our state's skilled workforce, creating hundreds of new jobs. This contract is a reaffirmation of Mississippi's longstanding shipbuilding industry and the professional men and women who continue that tradition. I know the U.S. Navy and the American taxpayer will once again be well served by Northrop Grumman, and I look forward to the day this ship is delivered."

The LHA 6 will replace one of the aging LHA 1 class of amphibious assault ships. Like its predecessors, it will be able to operate as the flagship for an expeditionary strike group. Ships of this type may also play a key role in the Maritime Pre-Positioning Force (Future). Northrop Grumman has built five LHAs as well as seven USS Wasp (LHD 1) class ships. The Pascagoula shipyard is currently building an eighth LHD, Makin Island.

LHA 6 design modifications optimize aviation operations and support activities. Removal of the well deck provides for an extended hangar deck with two wider high bay areas, each fitted with an overhead crane for aircraft maintenance. Other enhancements include a reconfigurable command and control complex, a hospital facility, additional aviation fuel capacity, and numerous aviation support spaces.
These changes equip the ship to be an integral part of joint, interagency and multinational maritime forces. It will be configured to support landing force elements as well as various naval amphibious command and control and support organizations.


Northrop Grumman Corporation is a $30 billion global defense and technology company whose 122,000 employees provide innovative systems, products, and solutions in information and services, electronics, aerospace and shipbuilding to government and commercial customers worldwide.

-ends-

[P44]

no seguimento da noticia postada acima

LHA 6

[P44]

March 2007
George H. W. Bush at Pier 1, Northrop Grumman Newport News

[Rui Elias Maltez]

Relativamente ao CVN USS George W. Bush, ouvi ou li, já não me lembro onde que seria o último dos CVN da classe Nimitz.

Alguem confirma?

[manuel.liste]

Relativamente ao CVN USS George W. Bush, ouvi ou li, já não me lembro onde que seria o último dos CVN da classe Nimitz.

Alguem confirma?

Mmm... será el USS George H. W. Bush.

George W. Bush es otro tipo

Según Wikipedia en inglés es cierto: será el último buque de la clase Nimitz

[Rui Elias Maltez]

Obrigado, estimado Manuel.

E com esse nome, fico mais descansado.

[P44]

Obrigado, estimado Manuel.

E com esse nome, fico mais descansado.

não ficamos todos?

CVN-77, tb conhecido como USS "Pai do aborto" :mrgreen:

Rui:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CVN-77

USS George H. W. Bush (CVN-77) is the tenth and last Nimitz class supercarrier of the United States Navy. She is named for former President George H. W. Bush, who was a naval aviator during World War II. George H. W. Bush is to be the final Nimitz class aircraft carrier constructed; her successor will be Gerald R. Ford, the first of a new class.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CVN-78

USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) is to be the lead ship of her class of United States Navy supercarriers. The ship will be named after the 38th President of the United States, Gerald R. Ford, which the Navy announced on January 16, 2007.[1]

Ford is currently scheduled to be laid down in 2009, concurrently or nearly so with the commissioning of USS George H. W. Bush. Construction work has already begun; on August 11, 2005, Northrop Grumman held a ceremonial steel cut for a 15-ton plate that will form part of a side shell unit of the carrier. If construction of the carrier remains on schedule the new ship should join the U.S. Navy’s active fleet as a fully commissioned warship in 2015. Ford is slated to replace the current Enterprise, ending her 50 plus years of service with the United States Navy.[

[Matheus]

Não sei se o pessoal já viu este vídeo, mas é bem louco, literalmente

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8GIx1r4wkxU&eurl=

[P44]

mais a proposito do CVN-78, parece que os custos vão disparar (again...!)

USN's future aircraft carrier faces key-equipment delay
01 October 2007

Technical challenges could delay the introduction of key equipment in the construction schedule of the US Navy's (USN's) Gerald R Ford-class future aircraft carrier programme (CVN 21), according to the US Government Accountability Office (GAO).

A report on the construction of the first-of-class Gerald R Ford (CVN 78) states that the consequences of the failure to develop technology "may lead to increases in the planned construction costs" and result in potential reductions in the ship's capability at the point of delivery.

In addition, the GAO believes that the navy's cost estimates are "optimistic" and its overall target cost is "unachievable". One assumption from the navy is that fewer manpower hours will be required than for the previous two carriers. Insufficient cost surveillance also means that the navy will not be able to identify early signs of cost growth and take "corrective action".

A tight development schedule for the ship's critical technologies could impede the design process and delay the construction of CVN 78. Equipment singled out as the main potential causes of delay include the electromagnetic aircraft launch system (EMALS), the advanced arresting gear - both built by General Atomics - and the dual-band radar manufactured by Raytheon.

These systems "warrant the most concern at this point", says the GAO "because they have a high impact on both ship capability and construction schedule".

JANES

[P44]

U.S. Navy Cancels LCS 4



The U.S. Navy announced Nov. 1 it had canceled the fourth Littoral Combat Ship in the service’s latest dose of tough love to shipbuilders.

Over the past months, the Navy has halved its orders for the small, next-generation ships; Lockheed Martin and General Dynamics now are building one LCS sea frame each, based on separate designs. Originally the contractors were to build two apiece.
The Navy cited cost overruns on LCS 2, now under construction by General Dynamics at Austal USA’s shipyard in Mobile, Ala., as the main reason for the cancellation of the second General Dynamics ship, LCS 4. The Navy terminated the contract for Lockheed Martin’s second sea frame, LCS 3, in the spring.
“The Navy worked closely with General Dynamics to try to restructure the agreement for LCS 4 to more equitably balance cost and risk but could not come to terms and conditions that were acceptable to both parties,” the Navy said in a statement issued by Navy Secretary Donald C. Winter and Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Gary Roughead.
Nonetheless, Winter restated the Navy’s commitment to the LCS platform.
“LCS continues to be a critical warfighting requirement for our Navy to maintain dominance in the littorals and strategic choke points around the world,” Winter said. “While this is a difficult decision, we recognize that active oversight and strict cost controls in the early years are necessary to ensuring we can deliver these ships to the fleet over the long term,” he said in the statement.
Originally priced at $233 million apiece, the Navy has acknowledged that LCS costs have ballooned between 50 percent and 75 percent.
Senate appropriators slashed funding for the second General Dynamics-built ship Sept. 12 in their version of the fiscal 2008 defense spending bill.
In their report accompanying the bill, Senate appropriators said LCS 1 and 2, named Freedom and Independence, should be delivered to the Navy next summer, and that the Navy should decide which variety to build by the end of 2008. The committee also directed the Navy to produce “a new acquisition strategy for the future procurement of the LCS class.”
The House version of the bill, which was passed this summer, cut $571 million from the program for 2008 — reducing funding to $339.5 million. The money and materiel from previous years would be used to build a single LCS, according to House lawmakers.
Differences between the House and Senate versions of the spending bill are to be resolved in committee.

http://www.defensenews.com/story.php...3932&C=america

[P44]

confirmação:

Navy Terminates Littoral Combat Ship (LCS 4) Contract


(Source: US Department of Defense; issued Nov. 2, 2007)


Secretary of the Navy Donald C. Winter and Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Gary Roughead announced today that the Department of the Navy is terminating construction of the fourth littoral combat ship (LCS 4) for convenience under the termination clause of the contract because the Navy and General Dynamics could not reach agreement on the terms of a modified contract.

The Navy had not yet authorized construction on LCS 4, following a series of cost overruns on LCS 2. The Navy intended to begin construction of LCS 4 if the Navy and General Dynamics could agree on the terms for a fixed-price incentive agreement. The Navy worked closely with General Dynamics to try to restructure the agreement for LCS 4 to more equitably balance cost and risk, but could not come to terms and conditions that were acceptable to both parties.

The Navy remains committed to the LCS program. “LCS continues to be a critical warfighting requirement for our Navy to maintain dominance in the littorals and strategic choke points around the world,” said Winter. “While this is a difficult decision, we recognize that active oversight and strict cost controls in the early years are necessary to ensuring we can deliver these ships to the fleet over the long term.”

“I am absolutely committed to the Littoral Combat Ship,” said Roughead. “We need this ship. It is very important that our acquisition efforts produce the right littoral combat ship capability to the fleet at the right cost.” (ends)


(EDITOR’S NOTE: Having canceled Lockheed Martin’s contract to build the competing LCS 3 ship in March, the US Navy now is stuck with only the two lead ships of each competing design, both of which are facing performance issues and major cost over-runs. With lukewarm Congressional backing, and many critics, the future of the entire LCS program, which was originally planned to include over 50 ships, is now very much up in the air.)

-ends-

[P44]

Op-Ed: Crusading Navy Secretary Cancels 300-Ship Fleet


(Source: The Lexington Institute; issued Nov. 6, 2007)


(© The Lexington Institute; reproduced by permission)



By Loren B. Thompson, Ph.D.


With all the breaking news last week -- martial law in Pakistan, Hillary besieged by pygmies -- you may have missed the big announcement coming out of the U.S. Navy. Hard-charging Navy Secretary Donald Winter has brought his crusade for fundamental reform in the shipbuilding industry to its first major milestone, effectively canceling plans for a 300-ship fleet.

That's the likely long-term consequence of his decision to terminate a contract with General Dynamics for a new warship called the Littoral Combat Ship. Unless an aggressive new superpower emerges somewhere in the world to focus the minds of policymakers, the Navy's inventory of warships will remain well below 300 vessels for the foreseeable future.

Perhaps you heard the news about the contract cancellation but didn't realize what it meant for the size of the fleet. So let's review the facts. The size of the Navy has been cut in half since the height of the Reagan defense build-up, from nearly 600 warships to about 280.

The fleet will continue shrinking in the future if the service can't find a way of buying submarines and surface combatants for less than $2 billion a pop, because the number of old warships being retired will outpace the number of new warships being built. At about $400 million per vessel fully loaded, the Littoral Combat Ship is the only program the Navy has in place that can keep up with the pace of retirements to stabilize fleet numbers, and it was supposed to generate about six new warships per year between 2009 and 2016.

But now the Navy Secretary has decided to cancel contracts with both of the companies competing to build the new class of ships, leaving a big hole in shipbuilding plans. The Navy says it is still committed to the program, but judging from the way negotiations went with General Dynamics and rival Lockheed Martin, there's no way to reconcile the insistence of shipbuilders on limitation of risks with the Navy customer's insistence on low cost.

Having already seen cost increases on initial prototypes of the ship built by the two companies, Secretary Winter decided neither one would be allowed to build a second ship unless it signed up to a fixed-price contract. However, the Navy wasn't willing to restrain itself from making changes to the ship design after the contracts were signed, so the companies couldn't know for sure what their costs would be. End result: neither company was willing to accept the Navy's terms.

Tinkering with programs long after design issues should have been resolved seems to be a Navy tradition. After Lockheed Martin won the competition to develop a new presidential helicopter, the Naval Air Systems Command informed the company that there would be a few changes to the baseline design -- over 1,000 of them. Oddly enough, the program then encountered unexpected cost growth.

But the helicopter program only involves two dozen airframes whereas the Littoral Combat Ship drives the size of the future fleet, so the Navy's inability to finalize design specifications is beginning to look self-destructive.

Contractors aren't blameless in this controversy, but when you survey the sorry history of the Littoral Combat Ship, it's hard to escape the impression that the Navy acquisition community has a death-wish.

First it decides to build next-generation warships in record time at shipyards with little experience in constructing complex surface combatants.

Then it tells contractors to start bending metal before shipbuilding rules have been stabilized.

And when cost overruns inevitably follow, it tells companies they must sign up to contracts with fixed prices but unlimited risks.

It's no wonder the nation's new maritime strategy stresses cooperation with foreign navies -- at the rate we're going, those foreign navies are going to own most of the modern warships in the future.

-ends-