Pressões Nucleares sobre o Brasil

[cassiosemasas]

Youtube:

isso quer dizer[destacar]"Bem vindo ao Clube"[/destacar]"tudo bem eles são de boa" e somos mesmos.
e isso não é de hoje!!!!

[Marino]

Não dá para confiar nos hermanos...

Argentinos temeram ambição nuclear de Lula
Em documentos divulgados pelo WikiLeaks, diplomatas do país vizinho relatam preocupação com
aproximação entre o Brasil e países como o Irã
ROBERTO SIMON - O Estado de S.Paulo
A Argentina temeu que as ambições internacionais do governo do ex-presidente Luiz Inácio Lula
da Silva levassem o Brasil a rever seus compromissos na área de proliferação nuclear - caminhando
perigosamente rumo à bomba atômica. Em conversa reservada com diplomatas americanos no dia de
Natal de 2009, funcionários argentinos disseram que uma "luz amarela" acendera em Buenos Aires
diante da aproximação do Brasil com o Irã de Mahmoud Ahmadinejad e da abertura de uma embaixada
brasileira na Coreia do Norte.
O relato completo do encontro está entre as centenas de cabos da Embaixada dos EUA em
Buenos Aires divulgados pelo WikiLeaks. "Confidencial", a mensagem revela como traços da rivalidade
histórica no campo nuclear entre os vizinhos não foram totalmente apagados, nem mesmo com a
aproximação a partir do fim dos anos 80 e a calorosa relação entre os governos Lula e Néstor Kirchner.
Chefe da direção de assuntos atômicos da Chancelaria de Buenos Aires, Gustavo Ainchil falou
sobre o temor argentino à embaixadora americana Vilma Martínez. Amparado em sua "imensa
popularidade", Lula adotou uma política externa "arriscada", analisou o argentino. Além do Irã e da
missão em Pyongyang, Ainchil cita o fato de o Brasil ser "o único Bric" sem a bomba atômica - em 2009,
a África do Sul ainda não integrava o grupo. Ainchil diz que há "certo alívio" na Argentina com o iminente
fim do governo Lula. "Nenhum sucessor tentará manter uma política externa tão arriscada."
Preocupação. Antes dessa conversa, outro diplomata argentino, não identificado, havia
procurado a Embaixada dos EUA em Brasília com a mesma mensagem de preocupação. O despacho
revelado pelo WikiLeaks foi enviado dois meses após o vice-presidente José Alencar ter defendido uma
arma nuclear brasileira, o que "daria mais respeitabilidade" ao País. Procurados pelo Estado, os
governos da Argentina, EUA e Brasil não quiseram se pronunciar oficialmente.
A Argentina chegou a pensar numa resposta a uma eventual retirada do Brasil da agência
argentino-brasileira de controle nuclear (ABACC) ou mesmo na possibilidade - "improvável" - de o País
fabricar a bomba. Os argentinos, então, buscariam "desenvolver tecnologia nuclear pacífica avançada
para mostrar sua capacidade, mas sem seguir o caminho todo até a bomba".
Federico Merke, da universidade argentina de San Andrés, diz que o cabo do WikiLeaks "é uma
boa descrição da incerteza que existe entre funcionários e analistas argentinos". "O Brasil não é visto
como um país que logo terá a bomba, mas como um Estado que não termina de tornar transparente seu
programa nuclear", afirmou ao Estado.

[rodrigo]

Argentinos temeram ambição nuclear de Lula

Nessa reportagem, o que é essa cobertura na obra de Angra III, na fotografia?

[varj]

Isto na verdade me cheirou mais a um puxa saquismo daqueles por parte de nossos vizinhos...foram chorar com papai urso que havíamos passado na frente deles.E com as Malvinas começando a cheirar......

[Marino]

Artigo garimpado pelo Delta no fórum irmão:


Can Brazil Stop Iran?

By BERNARD ARONSON
Published: April 3, 2012

Washington




BRAZIL, the saying used to go, is the land of the future — and always will be. But when Brazil’s president, Dilma Rousseff, visits the White House next week, she will come as the leader of a country whose future has arrived.

With huge new offshore oil discoveries and foreign investment flooding in, Brazil’s economy, growing twice as fast as America’s, has surpassed Britain’s to become the world’s seventh largest. As a member of the Group of 20 and host of the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympics, Brazil is an emerging global leader.

But there is one area where it has an opportunity to lead and has failed to: preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. Brazil should take the bold step of voluntarily ending its uranium enrichment program and calling on other nations, including Iran, to follow its example.

Brazil started off as a force for nonproliferation. It voluntarily placed its nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency supervision in 1991 and later joined the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. But in 2004, Brazil, home to the world’s fifth largest uranium reserves, also proclaimed that all states had an “inalienable right” to enrich uranium for “peaceful purposes.” It then constructed an enrichment facility and fought with the I.A.E.A. for more than a year before giving inspectors access.

Brazil says its enrichment program is for peaceful purposes, and there is no reason to doubt it. The treaty permits signers to produce enriched uranium to fuel commercial and research reactors, store the radioactive fuel and reprocess spent fuel as long as all nuclear facilities are subject to I.A.E.A. oversight.

But the its greatest flaw is that the same facilities that enrich uranium for peaceful purposes can also be used to enrich it further for nuclear weapons. And reprocessed fuel from peaceful reactors yields plutonium that can be used in nuclear bombs. By exploiting this “enrichment loophole,” North Korea developed a covert program to reprocess spent fuel, withdrew from the treaty and, soon after, developed nuclear weapons. Iran is trying to do the same.

Of the countries now operating or constructing nuclear energy or research reactors under the treaty, more than 40 also have the capabilities to build nuclear weapons by exploiting this loophole. If Iran develops this capability, it could, as President Obama has warned, exert inexorable pressure on Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Turkey to quickly pursue nuclear weapons themselves.

Brazil has unique standing among developing nations to address this proliferation danger because of its historic, nationalist defense of enrichment. If it were to renounce its right to enrich uranium in the name of international peace, close its enrichment facility, embrace a longstanding United Nations proposal to accept enriched uranium from the I.A.E.A., let the agency reprocess its spent fuel — essentially the deal offered to Iran — and call on other states that have signed the treaty to do the same, it would transform the nuclear debate.

A new Brazilian stance would take away Iran’s principal argument that the advanced nuclear weapons states are pursuing a form of “nuclear apartheid” by pulling up the enrichment “drawbridge” before developing nations have a chance to cross. It would also give Iran a face-saving way to join other developing nations in a new multilateral effort to suspend enrichment rather than appearing to yield to Western sanctions and threats. Finally, if Brazil and other developing nations were to give up enrichment, it would make possible a new concerted international effort to close the enrichment loophole permanently by amending the nonproliferation treaty.

There are obstacles. Powerful commercial and military constituencies have a vested interest in continuing Brazil’s enrichment program, and Brazilian nationalists would have to be mollified. Thus, it is vital that Brazil be perceived as acting on its own rather than yielding to pressure from Washington.

Still, the United States could offer incentives behind closed doors. Mr. Obama is weighing proposals to reduce America’s fully operational nuclear arsenal by 30 percent or even more. Brazil currently leads a group of eight non-nuclear states that are pressing nuclear powers, including the United States, to deliver on their treaty commitments and move toward eventual nuclear disarmament — and if there were a breakthrough on this front Brazil would be given substantial credit. Congress and the White House could also revisit the punitive tariff on Brazil’s sugar-cane-based ethanol, which forces Americans to rely on more expensive corn-based ethanol and drives up the global price of food.

Renouncing its enrichment rights would overnight catapult Brazil into a position of global leadership on the most urgent security challenge facing the international community. And Brazil’s leadership would inevitably shape the context for any future discussions about Brazil’s permanent membership on an expanded United Nations Security Council — one of its longstanding ambitions.

At a moment when the world is facing the prospect of war with Iran, Ms. Rousseff has the opportunity to make a courageous overture to help defuse the crisis; she should seize it.

Bernard Aronson, a private equity manager, was assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs from 1989 to 1993.

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/04/opini ... r=1&src=tp

[Sávio Ricardo]

Artigo garimpado pelo Delta no fórum irmão:


Can Brazil Stop Iran?

By BERNARD ARONSON
Published: April 3, 2012

Washington




BRAZIL, the saying used to go, is the land of the future — and always will be. But when Brazil’s president, Dilma Rousseff, visits the White House next week, she will come as the leader of a country whose future has arrived.

With huge new offshore oil discoveries and foreign investment flooding in, Brazil’s economy, growing twice as fast as America’s, has surpassed Britain’s to become the world’s seventh largest. As a member of the Group of 20 and host of the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympics, Brazil is an emerging global leader.

But there is one area where it has an opportunity to lead and has failed to: preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. Brazil should take the bold step of voluntarily ending its uranium enrichment program and calling on other nations, including Iran, to follow its example.

Brazil started off as a force for nonproliferation. It voluntarily placed its nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency supervision in 1991 and later joined the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. But in 2004, Brazil, home to the world’s fifth largest uranium reserves, also proclaimed that all states had an “inalienable right” to enrich uranium for “peaceful purposes.” It then constructed an enrichment facility and fought with the I.A.E.A. for more than a year before giving inspectors access.

Brazil says its enrichment program is for peaceful purposes, and there is no reason to doubt it. The treaty permits signers to produce enriched uranium to fuel commercial and research reactors, store the radioactive fuel and reprocess spent fuel as long as all nuclear facilities are subject to I.A.E.A. oversight.

But the its greatest flaw is that the same facilities that enrich uranium for peaceful purposes can also be used to enrich it further for nuclear weapons. And reprocessed fuel from peaceful reactors yields plutonium that can be used in nuclear bombs. By exploiting this “enrichment loophole,” North Korea developed a covert program to reprocess spent fuel, withdrew from the treaty and, soon after, developed nuclear weapons. Iran is trying to do the same.

Of the countries now operating or constructing nuclear energy or research reactors under the treaty, more than 40 also have the capabilities to build nuclear weapons by exploiting this loophole. If Iran develops this capability, it could, as President Obama has warned, exert inexorable pressure on Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Turkey to quickly pursue nuclear weapons themselves.

Brazil has unique standing among developing nations to address this proliferation danger because of its historic, nationalist defense of enrichment. If it were to renounce its right to enrich uranium in the name of international peace, close its enrichment facility, embrace a longstanding United Nations proposal to accept enriched uranium from the I.A.E.A., let the agency reprocess its spent fuel — essentially the deal offered to Iran — and call on other states that have signed the treaty to do the same, it would transform the nuclear debate.

A new Brazilian stance would take away Iran’s principal argument that the advanced nuclear weapons states are pursuing a form of “nuclear apartheid” by pulling up the enrichment “drawbridge” before developing nations have a chance to cross. It would also give Iran a face-saving way to join other developing nations in a new multilateral effort to suspend enrichment rather than appearing to yield to Western sanctions and threats. Finally, if Brazil and other developing nations were to give up enrichment, it would make possible a new concerted international effort to close the enrichment loophole permanently by amending the nonproliferation treaty.

There are obstacles. Powerful commercial and military constituencies have a vested interest in continuing Brazil’s enrichment program, and Brazilian nationalists would have to be mollified. Thus, it is vital that Brazil be perceived as acting on its own rather than yielding to pressure from Washington.

Still, the United States could offer incentives behind closed doors. Mr. Obama is weighing proposals to reduce America’s fully operational nuclear arsenal by 30 percent or even more. Brazil currently leads a group of eight non-nuclear states that are pressing nuclear powers, including the United States, to deliver on their treaty commitments and move toward eventual nuclear disarmament — and if there were a breakthrough on this front Brazil would be given substantial credit. Congress and the White House could also revisit the punitive tariff on Brazil’s sugar-cane-based ethanol, which forces Americans to rely on more expensive corn-based ethanol and drives up the global price of food.

Renouncing its enrichment rights would overnight catapult Brazil into a position of global leadership on the most urgent security challenge facing the international community. And Brazil’s leadership would inevitably shape the context for any future discussions about Brazil’s permanent membership on an expanded United Nations Security Council — one of its longstanding ambitions.

At a moment when the world is facing the prospect of war with Iran, Ms. Rousseff has the opportunity to make a courageous overture to help defuse the crisis; she should seize it.

Bernard Aronson, a private equity manager, was assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs from 1989 to 1993.

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/04/opini ... r=1&src=tp

hahahahahaha

Tava na cara que tanto puxasaquismo não era em vão por parte do Mr. Bernard Aronson.

Querem que nós agora, cancelamos nosso programa nucleare pacifico e usemos o Uranio enriquecido da AIEA, tudo isso em nome da paz mundial???

Era só oque faltava...é o maximo da hipocrisia.

Isso é facil de de resolver, querem isso da gente? Então não deverá mais existir armas nucleares no mundo, todos paises que as possuem devem elimina-los, após a comprovação feita por um grupo com representantes de todos os paises interessados, todos deveram adquirir o uranio enriquecido para fins pacificos da AIEA e assim podemos rasgar o TNP de uma vez. PRONTO.

Me dá raiva ler umas coisas dessas...

[Marino]

Minha resposta para este senhor é muito simples e direta, mas impublicavel sem que eu sofra sanções.
Mas os amigos podem imaginar qual é!

[Brasileiro]

Nessa reportagem, o que é essa cobertura na obra de Angra III, na fotografia?

Olha, acredito que seja uma proteção contra chuvas para a construção das bases do reator e das fundações de suas instalações.
Neste lugar há escavações que alcançam profundidades de alguns metros abaixo do nível do mar. Pode-se ver em imagens antigas do Google Earth, na época em que a construção esteve paralisada, que o local ficou alagado por um tempo.

Pode ser também que simplesmente não queiram ser "filmados" por ninguém lá do alto quando da instalação do reator.



abraços]

[Clermont]

Minha resposta para este senhor é muito simples e direta, mas impublicavel sem que eu sofra sanções.
Mas os amigos podem imaginar qual é!

Apoiado!

Chantagista F.D.P. esse, hein?

Agora, por outro lado, a gente pode saber, um pouquinho, como se sentem os iranianos, quando são alvo de atitudes ainda mais medonhas e agressivas que a sugestão calhorda deste patife Bernard Aronson.

[romeo]

Artigo garimpado pelo Delta no fórum irmão:


Can Brazil Stop Iran?

By BERNARD ARONSON
Published: April 3, 2012

Washington




BRAZIL, the saying used to go, is the land of the future — and always will be. But when Brazil’s president, Dilma Rousseff, visits the White House next week, she will come as the leader of a country whose future has arrived.

With huge new offshore oil discoveries and foreign investment flooding in, Brazil’s economy, growing twice as fast as America’s, has surpassed Britain’s to become the world’s seventh largest. As a member of the Group of 20 and host of the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympics, Brazil is an emerging global leader.

But there is one area where it has an opportunity to lead and has failed to: preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. Brazil should take the bold step of voluntarily ending its uranium enrichment program and calling on other nations, including Iran, to follow its example.

Brazil started off as a force for nonproliferation. It voluntarily placed its nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency supervision in 1991 and later joined the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. But in 2004, Brazil, home to the world’s fifth largest uranium reserves, also proclaimed that all states had an “inalienable right” to enrich uranium for “peaceful purposes.” It then constructed an enrichment facility and fought with the I.A.E.A. for more than a year before giving inspectors access.

Brazil says its enrichment program is for peaceful purposes, and there is no reason to doubt it. The treaty permits signers to produce enriched uranium to fuel commercial and research reactors, store the radioactive fuel and reprocess spent fuel as long as all nuclear facilities are subject to I.A.E.A. oversight.

But the its greatest flaw is that the same facilities that enrich uranium for peaceful purposes can also be used to enrich it further for nuclear weapons. And reprocessed fuel from peaceful reactors yields plutonium that can be used in nuclear bombs. By exploiting this “enrichment loophole,” North Korea developed a covert program to reprocess spent fuel, withdrew from the treaty and, soon after, developed nuclear weapons. Iran is trying to do the same.

Of the countries now operating or constructing nuclear energy or research reactors under the treaty, more than 40 also have the capabilities to build nuclear weapons by exploiting this loophole. If Iran develops this capability, it could, as President Obama has warned, exert inexorable pressure on Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Turkey to quickly pursue nuclear weapons themselves.

Brazil has unique standing among developing nations to address this proliferation danger because of its historic, nationalist defense of enrichment. If it were to renounce its right to enrich uranium in the name of international peace, close its enrichment facility, embrace a longstanding United Nations proposal to accept enriched uranium from the I.A.E.A., let the agency reprocess its spent fuel — essentially the deal offered to Iran — and call on other states that have signed the treaty to do the same, it would transform the nuclear debate.

A new Brazilian stance would take away Iran’s principal argument that the advanced nuclear weapons states are pursuing a form of “nuclear apartheid” by pulling up the enrichment “drawbridge” before developing nations have a chance to cross. It would also give Iran a face-saving way to join other developing nations in a new multilateral effort to suspend enrichment rather than appearing to yield to Western sanctions and threats. Finally, if Brazil and other developing nations were to give up enrichment, it would make possible a new concerted international effort to close the enrichment loophole permanently by amending the nonproliferation treaty.

There are obstacles. Powerful commercial and military constituencies have a vested interest in continuing Brazil’s enrichment program, and Brazilian nationalists would have to be mollified. Thus, it is vital that Brazil be perceived as acting on its own rather than yielding to pressure from Washington.

Still, the United States could offer incentives behind closed doors. Mr. Obama is weighing proposals to reduce America’s fully operational nuclear arsenal by 30 percent or even more. Brazil currently leads a group of eight non-nuclear states that are pressing nuclear powers, including the United States, to deliver on their treaty commitments and move toward eventual nuclear disarmament — and if there were a breakthrough on this front Brazil would be given substantial credit. Congress and the White House could also revisit the punitive tariff on Brazil’s sugar-cane-based ethanol, which forces Americans to rely on more expensive corn-based ethanol and drives up the global price of food.

Renouncing its enrichment rights would overnight catapult Brazil into a position of global leadership on the most urgent security challenge facing the international community. And Brazil’s leadership would inevitably shape the context for any future discussions about Brazil’s permanent membership on an expanded United Nations Security Council — one of its longstanding ambitions.

At a moment when the world is facing the prospect of war with Iran, Ms. Rousseff has the opportunity to make a courageous overture to help defuse the crisis; she should seize it.

Bernard Aronson, a private equity manager, was assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs from 1989 to 1993.

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/04/opini ... r=1&src=tp

Puxa... Estão falando mal do camaradinha.... Eu achei uma excelente idéia, apenas com o endereço errado.

O único reparo que tenho a fazer é que o ilustre senhor pensou pequeno.

Tal proposta deve ser feita aos EUA, e não ao Brasil, pelo peso daquele explendoroso e ultra maravilhoso país; lider da democracia e do bem estar geral no concerto das nações.

Aí sim; adotado este procedimento pelos nossos grandes amigos do norte, todo o mundo seria influenciado positivamente.

[cassiosemasas]

Can Brazil Stop Iran?

By BERNARD ARONSON
Published: April 3, 2012

Washington

PALHAÇADA!!!

[Marino]

Artigo garimpado pelo Delta no fórum irmão:


Can Brazil Stop Iran?

By BERNARD ARONSON
Published: April 3, 2012

Washington




BRAZIL, the saying used to go, is the land of the future — and always will be. But when Brazil’s president, Dilma Rousseff, visits the White House next week, she will come as the leader of a country whose future has arrived.

With huge new offshore oil discoveries and foreign investment flooding in, Brazil’s economy, growing twice as fast as America’s, has surpassed Britain’s to become the world’s seventh largest. As a member of the Group of 20 and host of the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympics, Brazil is an emerging global leader.

But there is one area where it has an opportunity to lead and has failed to: preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. Brazil should take the bold step of voluntarily ending its uranium enrichment program and calling on other nations, including Iran, to follow its example.

Brazil started off as a force for nonproliferation. It voluntarily placed its nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency supervision in 1991 and later joined the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. But in 2004, Brazil, home to the world’s fifth largest uranium reserves, also proclaimed that all states had an “inalienable right” to enrich uranium for “peaceful purposes.” It then constructed an enrichment facility and fought with the I.A.E.A. for more than a year before giving inspectors access.

Brazil says its enrichment program is for peaceful purposes, and there is no reason to doubt it. The treaty permits signers to produce enriched uranium to fuel commercial and research reactors, store the radioactive fuel and reprocess spent fuel as long as all nuclear facilities are subject to I.A.E.A. oversight.

But the its greatest flaw is that the same facilities that enrich uranium for peaceful purposes can also be used to enrich it further for nuclear weapons. And reprocessed fuel from peaceful reactors yields plutonium that can be used in nuclear bombs. By exploiting this “enrichment loophole,” North Korea developed a covert program to reprocess spent fuel, withdrew from the treaty and, soon after, developed nuclear weapons. Iran is trying to do the same.

Of the countries now operating or constructing nuclear energy or research reactors under the treaty, more than 40 also have the capabilities to build nuclear weapons by exploiting this loophole. If Iran develops this capability, it could, as President Obama has warned, exert inexorable pressure on Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Turkey to quickly pursue nuclear weapons themselves.

Brazil has unique standing among developing nations to address this proliferation danger because of its historic, nationalist defense of enrichment. If it were to renounce its right to enrich uranium in the name of international peace, close its enrichment facility, embrace a longstanding United Nations proposal to accept enriched uranium from the I.A.E.A., let the agency reprocess its spent fuel — essentially the deal offered to Iran — and call on other states that have signed the treaty to do the same, it would transform the nuclear debate.

A new Brazilian stance would take away Iran’s principal argument that the advanced nuclear weapons states are pursuing a form of “nuclear apartheid” by pulling up the enrichment “drawbridge” before developing nations have a chance to cross. It would also give Iran a face-saving way to join other developing nations in a new multilateral effort to suspend enrichment rather than appearing to yield to Western sanctions and threats. Finally, if Brazil and other developing nations were to give up enrichment, it would make possible a new concerted international effort to close the enrichment loophole permanently by amending the nonproliferation treaty.

There are obstacles. Powerful commercial and military constituencies have a vested interest in continuing Brazil’s enrichment program, and Brazilian nationalists would have to be mollified. Thus, it is vital that Brazil be perceived as acting on its own rather than yielding to pressure from Washington.

Still, the United States could offer incentives behind closed doors. Mr. Obama is weighing proposals to reduce America’s fully operational nuclear arsenal by 30 percent or even more. Brazil currently leads a group of eight non-nuclear states that are pressing nuclear powers, including the United States, to deliver on their treaty commitments and move toward eventual nuclear disarmament — and if there were a breakthrough on this front Brazil would be given substantial credit. Congress and the White House could also revisit the punitive tariff on Brazil’s sugar-cane-based ethanol, which forces Americans to rely on more expensive corn-based ethanol and drives up the global price of food.

Renouncing its enrichment rights would overnight catapult Brazil into a position of global leadership on the most urgent security challenge facing the international community. And Brazil’s leadership would inevitably shape the context for any future discussions about Brazil’s permanent membership on an expanded United Nations Security Council — one of its longstanding ambitions.

At a moment when the world is facing the prospect of war with Iran, Ms. Rousseff has the opportunity to make a courageous overture to help defuse the crisis; she should seize it.

Bernard Aronson, a private equity manager, was assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs from 1989 to 1993.

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/04/opini ... r=1&src=tp

Não demorou muito para ser traduzido pelo Estado de São Paulo:

O peso do Brasil na crise nuclear iraniana
O País poderia dar o exemplo acabando com seu programa de enriquecimento de urânio, medida
que ajudaria na obtenção de uma vaga permanente no Conselho de Segurança
*BERNARD ARONSON
THE NEW YORK TIMES
Dizem que o Brasil é o país do futuro – e sempre será. Mas quando a presidente brasileira, Dilma
Rousseff, visitar a Casa Branca na próxima semana, ela virá como a líder de um país cujo futuro já
chegou. Com suas imensas descobertas do pré-sal e os enormes investimentos estrangeiros no país, a
economia brasileira, que vem crescendo duas vezes mais rápido do que a americana, já superou a da
Grã-Bretanha e tornou-se a sétima maior do mundo (segundo a Economy Watch). Como membro do G-
20 e anfitriã da Copa do Mundo de 2014 e da Olimpíada de 2016, o Brasil hoje é um líder global
emergente.
Mas há uma área em que o país tem uma oportunidade de liderar, mas tem desapontado:
impedir a propagação das armas nucleares. O Brasil deveria tomar uma decisão corajosa de pôr fim,
voluntariamente, ao seu programa de enriquecimento de urânio e insistir que outras nações, incluindo o
Irã, sigam seu exemplo.
O Brasil surgiu como uma força no campo da não proliferação. Em 2001, voluntariamente, pôs
suas usinas nucleares à disposição dos inspetores da Agência Internacional de Energia Atômica (AIEA)
e, posteriormente, aderiu ao Tratado de Não Proliferação Nuclear (TNP). Mas, em 2004, o país, que
abriga a quinta maior reserva de urânio do mundo, proclamou que os Estados têm o “direito inalienável”
de enriquecer urânio para “fins pacíficos”. Construiu, então, uma usina de enriquecimento e defrontou-se
com a AIEA durante mais de um ano, antes de autorizar o acesso aos inspetores da agência.
O Brasil diz que seu programa de enriquecimento de urânio tem objetivos pacíficos e não há
razão para duvidar disso. O TNP permite a seus signatários produzir urânio enriquecido para seus
reatores de pesquisa e comerciais, armazenar combustível radioativo e reprocessar o combustível usado
desde que todas as usinas nucleares se submetam a uma inspeção da AIEA.
A grande falha está no fato de que as mesmas instalações nucleares que enriquecem urânio
para fins pacíficos também podem ser usadas para enriquecer urânio destinado à fabricação de armas
nucleares. E o combustível reprocessado dos reatores com fins pacíficos produz plutônio, que pode ser
usado para bombas atômicas. Explorando essa “brecha no TNP no tópico que trata do enriquecimento”,
a Coreia do Norte desenvolveu um programa secreto para reprocessar o combustível utilizado, retirou-se
do tratado e, logo depois, fabricou armas nucleares. O Irã está tentando fazer o mesmo.
Dos países que hoje operam ou estão construindo reatores de pesquisa ou centrais nucleares
para geração de energia, nos termos do TNP, mais de 40 têm capacidade para fabricar armas nucleares
explorando essa “brecha”. Se o Irã desenvolver sua base nuclear, poderá, como o presidente Barack
Obama tem alertado, exercer uma pressão inexorável sobre Arábia Saudita, Egito e Turquia para
também produzirem armas nucleares.
Entre as nações em desenvolvimento, o Brasil está numa posição excepcional para tentar
resolver o perigo da proliferação nuclear tendo em vista sua defesa histórica e nacionalista do
enriquecimento de urânio.
Se o país renunciar ao seu direito de enriquecer urânio em nome da paz internacional, fechar
suas usinas de enriquecimento, acolher uma antiga proposta das Nações Unidas para aceitar urânio
enriquecido da AIEA e permitir que a agência cuide do reprocessamento do seu combustível usado –
basicamente a mesma proposta feita ao Irã – e insistir que outros Estados que assinaram o tratado ajam
da mesma maneira, isso transformaria o debate nuclear.
Uma nova posição do Brasil extinguiria o principal argumento do Irã, de que os Estados
avançados possuidores de armas nucleares estão em busca de uma forma de “apartheid nuclear”. E isso
possibilitaria ao Irã um modo de sair dignamente da situação e se aliar a outras nações num novo
esforço multilateral para suspender o enriquecimento de urânio, em vez de sucumbir às ameaças e
sanções ocidentais.
Finalmente, se o Brasil e outros países em desenvolvimento desistirem de enriquecer urânio, isso
permitirá um novo esforço internacional para eliminar as brechas existentes no TNP com relação ao
enriquecimento de urânio de maneira permanente, por meio das emendas necessárias.
Obstáculos existem. Grupos militares e comerciais poderosos têm interesse na continuação do
programa de enriquecimento pelo Brasil e os nacionalistas brasileiros precisam ser acalmados. Assim, é
vital que o Brasil seja visto como um país que está agindo por vontade própria, em vez de estar se
submetendo às pressões de Washington.
Os EUA podem oferecer incentivos a portas fechadas. Obama está analisando propostas para
reduzir o arsenal nuclear operacional americano em 30% ou mais. Hoje, o Brasil lidera um grupo de oito
Estados não nucleares que pression as potências nucleares, incluindo os EUA, a comprometerem-se
com os termos do tratado e adotarem medidas para um eventual desarmamento.
E, se houver um grande avanço nessa frente, o Brasil teria um grande mérito. O Congresso e a
Casa Branca também poderão reexaminar as tarifas punitivas impostas sobre o etanol brasileiro, produto
da cana-de-açúcar, o que obriga os americanos a depender do etanol do milho, mais caro, e eleva os
preços globais dos alimentos.
Líder. Uma renúncia do seu direito de enriquecimento elevaria o Brasil, da noite para o dia, a
uma posição de líder global no mais premente desafio à segurança enfrentado pela comunidade
internacional.
A posição do Brasil, inevitavelmente, determinará o contexto para futuras discussões sobre a
entrada do País no Conselho de Segurança da ONU na qualidade de membro permanente, posição há
muito tempo ambicionada por Brasília.
No momento em que o mundo se depara com a perspectiva de uma guerra com o Irã, Dilma
Rousseff tem a oportunidade de fazer uma proposta corajosa para ajudar a neutralizar a crise. Ela deve
aproveitar. / TRADUÇÃO DE TEREZINHA MARTINO
*É ADMINISTRADOR DE FUNDOS DE PARTICIPAÇÃO ACIONÁRIA E EX-SECRETÁRIO ADJUNTO DE ESTADO
PARA OS ASSUNTOS INTERAMERICANOS DE 1989 A 1993

[LeandroGCard]

Puxa... Estão falando mal do camaradinha.... Eu achei uma excelente idéia, apenas com o endereço errado.

O único reparo que tenho a fazer é que o ilustre senhor pensou pequeno.

Tal proposta deve ser feita aos EUA, e não ao Brasil, pelo peso daquele explendoroso e ultra maravilhoso país; lider da democracia e do bem estar geral no concerto das nações.

Aí sim; adotado este procedimento pelos nossos grandes amigos do norte, todo o mundo seria influenciado positivamente.

Pois é, pensei em coisa parecida.

Porque não escolher algum território ou país neutro, que jamais tenha agredido nenhum outro em sua história e que esteja sujeito a dispositivos legais mundiais, regionais e até na sua própria constituição contra a produção e uso de armamento nulear, e transfere-se todo o enriquecimento para este país, retirando-o de países que possam causar suspeitas? Este país seria o "grande "fornecedor" da própria AIEA, e EUA, Israel e outros fechariam suas antigas, menos eficientes e NÃO-FISCALIZADAS unidades de enriquecimento e passariam a utilizar somente urânio enriquecido por este país, que cobraria pelo serviço apenas o preço justo de mercado.

Alguém conhece algum país com um perfil assim?


Leandro G. Card

[Oziris]

O Irã ?

[]'s

[Boss]

O Brasil ?