China...

[soultrain]

September 28, 2010
SNAPSHOT
China's Innovation Wall

Beijing's Push for Homegrown Technology
Adam Segal
ADAM SEGAL is Ira A. Lipman Senior Fellow in Counterterrorism and National Security Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations and the author of the forthcoming book Advantage: How American Innovation Can Overcome the Asian Challenge.

If you want to get to the bottom of indigenous innovation, the Chinese policy so deeply aggravating Western businesses and governments, look at the bottom of your DVD player. Most likely, the machine was made in China. For Beijing’s leaders, that is part of the problem: for every Chinese-made DVD player sold, the Chinese manufacturer must pay a large royalty fee to the European or Japanese companies that patented various components of the unit, such as its optical reader. These foreign firms reap substantial profits, but the Chinese take is extremely small -- and is shrinking further as energy, labor, and commodity prices rise. Policymakers in Beijing, looking to strengthen China’s economy, are no longer satisfied with the country’s position as the world’s manufacturer. Their solution is to break China’s dependence on foreign technology, moving from a model of “made in China” to one of “innovated in China.”

The Chinese phrase for indigenous innovation, zizhu chuangxin, was introduced in a 2006 state-issued report, “Guidelines on National Medium- and Long-Term Program for Science and Technology Development.” The paper contained a curious mix of top-down, state-directed policies alongside bottom-up efforts meant to foster technological innovation. The top-down measures echo China’s old state planning system. They include 20 state-driven megaprojects, including initiatives to develop nanotechnology, biotechnology and new drugs, high-end generic microchips, and aircraft. The bottom-up efforts seem to follow a Silicon Valley model and are centered on university-industry collaboration, small start-ups, and venture capital.

If these guidelines leave the government’s approach to technological innovation somewhat ambiguous, they are clear on ultimate objectives: China will become “an innovative nation in the next 15 years and a world power in science and technology fields by the middle of the twenty-first century.” By 2020, the report states, China should reduce its “degree of dependence on technology from other countries to 30 percent or less” (down from 50 percent today, as measured by the spending on technology imports as a share of the sum of domestic R&D funding plus technology imports). Noting that reliance on other countries--especially the United States and Japan -- is a threat to Chinese national and economic security, the paper calls for China not to purchase any “core technologies in key fields that affect the lifeblood of the national economy and national security,” such as next-generation Internet technologies; high-end, numerically controlled machine tools; and high-resolution earth observation systems.

New Chinese policies prompted by the report have raised the hackles of foreign governments and technology enterprises. In 2009, for example, China’s government, a massive consumer of high-tech products, announced that in order to be a recognized vendor in the government’s procurement catalog, a company would have to demonstrate that its products included indigenous innovation and were free of foreign intellectual property. Yet since R&D is a global, collaborative process, no individual high-tech product is completely independent of technology from outside of China. In April 2010, Beijing ordered those high-tech companies seeking to be listed on its procurement catalog to turn over the encryption codes to their smart cards, Internet routers, and other technology products.

In addition, China’s failure to protect intellectual property rights (IPR) in the Chinese market -- leading to massive theft and piracy -- is constantly in the background. As Senior Director for Greater China at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce Jeremie Waterman testified before the International Trade Commission in June, a weak legal environment allows Beijing to “intervene in the market for IP [intellectual property] and help its own companies ‘re-innovate’ competing IPR as a substitute to foreign technologies.”

The U.S. government has raised the issue in public. U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner, Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg, and Trade Representative Ron Kirk have openly denounced indigenous innovation and put it on the agenda for discussion at the annual Strategic and Economic Dialogue, the most important meeting between the two countries, and the U.S.-China Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade. U.S. businesses, which typically embrace quiet diplomacy with Beijing, have also publicly voiced their concerns. In a speech in Italy in July, General Electric CEO Jeffrey Immelt said, “I really worry about China. I am not sure that in the end they want any of us to win, or any of us to be successful.” And in a report for the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, business consultant James McGregor wrote that the guidelines are a “blueprint for technology theft on a scale the world has never seen before.”

In the face of this uproar, China has made some concessions. In May, Cao Jianlin, a vice minister at the Ministry of Science and Technology, noted that the 2009 procurement policy was an early draft and that future revisions would address concerns over IPR protection. Beijing has also announced that it intends to join the World Trade Organization’s Agreement on Government Procurement, a treaty that ensures nondiscriminatory access to government purchases for foreign companies, “as soon as possible.”

The problem for the United States is that these concessions are more tactical than real shifts in underlying policy. China’s leadership is broadly committed to the goals of reducing dependence on foreign technology, producing Chinese intellectual property, and creating Chinese technology champions. Even if China reverses certain policies under U.S. pressure, it will remain dedicated to those goals. U.S. policy is likely to become a game of Whac-a-Mole, beating down one Chinese initiative on indigenous innovation only to see another pop up.

That parts of China’s bureaucracy still advocate raising the country’s technological capabilities through trade-friendly policies, such as providing greater transparency and enforcing IPR-protection regulations, provide some glimmer of hope. They have not forgotten that China’s gradual opening to the world economic system brought with it billions of dollars in foreign investment, access to customers and distribution networks worldwide, and technology transfers from the West and Japan. In addition, many Chinese firms are looking to expand abroad, realizing that their global competitiveness will be severely curtailed if the Chinese market is isolated as a result of indigenous innovation initiatives. The challenge for the United States will be to identify and support these kinds of actors as they push against mercantilist policies.

Disputes over indigenous innovation may eventually cast a pall over the broader Sino-U.S. relationship. It is not hard to imagine battles over intellectual property and market share derailing collaborative efforts to address climate change, energy security, or global public health. If both sides fail to develop some common understandings of technology development and trade, the next decade is bound to be one of conflict and competition between them.
Copyright © 2002-2010 by the Council on Foreign Relations, Inc.
All rights reserved.

[FOXTROT]

forte.jor.br

China pratica disparo de mísseis contra caças F-22
19 de outubro de 2010, em Defesa Antiaérea, Sistema de Armas, Tecnologia, Treinamento, por Galante .

O Exército de Libertação do Povo Chinês recentemente realizou um exercício de interceptação contra caças stealth F-22 Raptor dos EUA, segundo o jornal Apple Daily de Hong Kong.

A imprensa japonesa em 3 de outubro informou que os japoneses e os militares dos EUA iriam realizar um exercício conjunto para recapturar as Ilhas Senkaku ou Diaoyutai, em novembro, no caso dos chineses capturá-las num ataque surpresa. Foi dito dito que o porta-aviões nuclear USS George Washington e caças F-22 Raptor vão participar no exercício.

Em 8 de outubro, cinco dias após a notícia, uma brigada da Força Aérea Chinesa do distrito militar de Chengdu, treinou o disparo de mísseis HQ-9 (versão chinesa do S-300 russo), seu mais novo míssil terra-ar, para atingir um alvo assumido como um F- 22, segundo o Apple Daily.

O Diário de Ciência e Tecnologia, publicado em Pequim, publicou uma história sobre o exercício. “Logo após o radar mandar a informação sobre a localização da caça “stealth” para a equipe de lançamento de mísseis, o míssil Hong Qi 9 voou para as nuvens e uma explosão foi ouvida apenas 40 segundos depois. Houve muitos aplausos para o sucesso do exercício”.

[marcelo l.]

http://mdn.mainichi.jp/mdnnews/internat ... 0000c.html

New attack sub docked at China's navy base in Hainan Island

BEIJING (Kyodo) -- At least one new Type 093 nuclear-powered attack submarine was docked at a Chinese navy base in Sanya, Hainan Island, in early September, a photograph obtained by Kyodo News by Wednesday showed.

While it was reported in China that the People's Liberation Army Navy deployed the "Shang-class" submarine in late 2006, the photograph marks the first time for the whereabouts of the submarine to be visually confirmed, according to Ping Kefu, a Hong Kong-based military analyst.

Ping said the PLA appears poised to advance the navy to the Indian Ocean and South China Sea and to form an aircraft carrier fleet in the future at a time when the navy seeks to expand its sphere of influence in the East China Sea, including areas around the disputed Senkaku Islands, and the South China Sea.

The islands -- administered by Japan but claimed by China and Taiwan -- become the source of a recent diplomatic row between Tokyo and Beijing, the worst in years.

The photograph, taken on Sept. 2, shows two nuclear-powered submarines docked at a quay in the base, which belongs to the South China Sea Fleet in Zhanjiang, Guangdong Province.

One submarine was confirmed to be a Type 093. Experts believe the other is also a Type 093, but said it is difficult to determine because the image for the second one is unclear.

It was found in 2008 that the PLA Navy deployed a Type 094 "Jin-class" ballistic missile submarine capable of loading nuclear missiles at the same base.

An expansion in deployment of nuclear-powered submarines by the navy is likely to increase a sense of alert by Southeast Asian countries that have territorial disputes with Beijing in the South China Sea, and India.

Measuring about 110 meters in length, the Type 093 submarine excels in striking power and silence in navigation, according to military experts.

It is said to perform on par with Russia's Victor III-class submarine.

China began construction of the PLA Navy base in Sanya around 2002 because water in surrounding areas is deep, making it difficult for submarines to be detected, the military experts said.

The country has nearly completed a large underground facility for nuclear-powered submarines, and the navy appears to be moving major vessels into the base.

The experts believe the base will be a strategic point for an aircraft carrier fleet in the future.

However, the PLA so far has released little information about the base.

[Enlil]

China apresenta o supercomputador mais veloz do mundo, superando EUA

Tianhe-1A pode fazer 2,5 quatrilhões de operações matemáticas por segundo

Do New York Times*


PEQUIM e SÃO FRANCISCO. Um centro de pesquisas científicas chinês construiu o computador mais rápido do mundo, superando os Estados Unidos e permitindo à China gabar-se de ser uma superpotência tecnológica.

O supercomputador, batizado de Tianhe-1A, é 1,4 vez mais potente que o do Laboratório Nacional de Oak Ridge, nos EUA, informou Jack Dongarra, cientista da computação da Universidade do Tennessee que mantém os rankings oficiais de supercomputadores.

O aparelho foi construído pela Universidade Nacional de Tecnologia de Defesa e está instalado no Centro Nacional de Supercomputação em Tianjin.

Ele tem capacidade de fazer cálculos à velocidade de 2,5 petaflops — isto é, mais de 2,5 quatrilhões de operações matemáticas por segundo.

O Tianhe-1A tem um poder equivalente ao de 175 mil laptops, informou ontem a fabricante de chips Nvidia. O supercomputador, segundo a empresa, usa 7.168 de suas unidades de processamento gráfico (GPUs), além de 14.336 CPUs da Intel. A Nvidia disse ainda que, sem suas GPUs, seriam necessários mais de 50 mil CPUs e o dobro de espaço físico.

Pastas de Defesa e Educação vão administrar máquina Apesar de a lista oficial das 500 máquinas mais rápidas, divulgada semestralmente, só estar fechada por Dongarra semana que vem, ele garante que o supercomputador chinês “detona o atual número um”, Cray XT5, conhecido como Jaguar.

Este, que usa 37.376 processadores AMD, pode tem desempenho de 1,7 petaflops, segundo o site da revista “Wired”.

— Só fechamos a lista em 1ode novembro, mas duvido que encontremos um sistema mais rápido — disse Dongarra ao “Times”, acrescentando esperar mais uma máquina chinesa entre as cinco mais velozes.

O Tianhe-1A, apresentado ontem em Pequim, ficará sob supervisão conjunta dos ministérios da Defesa e da Educação.

O supercomputador será utilizado por cientistas de diversas áreas e colocado à disposição de outros países.

O sistema chinês segue o tradicional modelo de combinar milhares de servidores de computadores pequenos, usando software para transformá-los em uma entidade única. Mas seu ingrediente secreto é a tecnologia de interconexão, desenvolvida por pesquisadores chineses, que transporta dados entre os vários computadores pequenos em altíssima velocidade, explicou Dongarra: — Essa tecnologia foi desenvolvida por eles. Eles levam a supercomputação muito a sério.

Para especialista, domínio americano está em risco A corrida pelo mais rápido supercomputador é motivo de orgulho nacional. As máquinas são cobiçadas por sua habilidade em resolver problemas em áreas críticas como defesa, energia, finanças e ciência. Os supercomputadores também são importantes no dia a dia: as petrolíferas os utilizam para encontrar petróleo e gás, enquanto Wall Street recorre a eles para operações ultrarrápidas.

E ainda ajudam a Procter & Gamble a colocar as batatas Pringles na lata sem quebrar.

O Tianhe-1A é o resultado de bilhões de dólares em investimento e desenvolvimento científico na China.

— O que assusta é que a dominação americana em computação de alto desempenho está em risco — disse Wu-chun Feng, professor da Universidade Politécnica da Virgínia. — Podese dizer que isso afeta a base de nosso futuro econômico.

Os EUA já haviam perdido a coroa da supercomputação em 2002, para o Japão. O governo americano reagiu, e o país recuperou a liderança em 2004 — e a manteve até agora.

Tianhe significa Via Láctea, segundo o site PCMag.

Fonte: O Globo via CCOMSEX

http://planobrasil.com/2010/10/29/china ... rando-eua/

[akivrx78]

segunda-feira, 1 de novembro de 2010 9:07
Pesqueiro chinês é responsável por choque com japoneses
Da AFP
0 comentário(s)

Um vídeo da Guarda Costeira japonesa mostrou a responsabilidade de um pesqueiro chinês em uma colisão no início de setembro com dois barcos japoneses, o que desencadeou a pior crise diplomática dos últimos anos entre Japão e China, afirmaram nesta segunda-feira parlamentares japoneses.

Cerca de 30 legisladores foram autorizados a assistir o vídeo gravado em 7 de setembro, a pouca distância de um grupo de pequenas ilhas no Mar da China Orienta, administrados pelo Japão, mas reivindicados pela China e Taiwan.

"O vídeo mostra claramente o momento em que aconteceram as colisões. Foi o barco chinês que se chocou com os barcos japoneses", declarou Hiroshi Nakai, presidente da Comissão Orçamentária da Assembleia Nacional.

Este filme de sete minutos confirma a tese do governo japonês, que acusou o pesqueiro chinês de ser responsável pelo acidente.

A Guarda Costeira prendeu em 8 de setembro o capitão do barco de pesca, mas tiveram que libertá-lo duas semanas depois, sob pressão e ameaças da China.

A difusão deste documento pode agravar a tensão entre os dois gigantes asiáticos, que disputam a soberania dessas ilhas chamadas Senkaku em japonês e Diaoyu em chinês.

http://www.dgabc.com.br/News/5838241/pe ... neses.aspx

Segundo o que se relata sobre as questões das ilhas, foi uma manobra para fortalecer o governo chines, desfocar o problema do Nobel da Paz, e culpar os japoneses pelos problemas internos chineses, ainda hoje esta ocorrendo protestos dentro da China cobrando do governo melhores salários, criticando a falta de emprego para o setor capacitado nível universitário, criticando a alta de alimentos e de aluguéis.
(emprego para mão de obra barata existe e falta vagas, mas para mão de obra capacitada não tem muita opção e quem cursou uma faculdade não quer trabalhar em uma fabrica em uma linha)
O problema é que o governo chines educou seus cidadães com um mapa que vai de Okinawa até Taiwan como seu território, assim se torna mais fácil manipulas a massa em uma crise.
Com a politica adotada de 1 filho por família, quem cumpriu a lei criou seu filho com muitas liberdades (são manhosos) e é difícil controlá-los porque sempre tiveram o privilégio de ter tudo o que queriam, por outro lado quem não cumpriu a lei não tem direito a acesso a escola para o segundo filho assim se criou uma nova geração de cidadães insatisfeitos com as politicas de seu governo.
Assim tem que existir um culpado o Japão.

[akivrx78]

China/Japão: Pequim rejeita mediação americana em conflito territorial com Tóquio
Pequim, China 02/11/2010 08:19 (LUSA)

Temas: Política, Diplomacia, relações internacionais, Conflitos (geral)
Pequim, 02 nov (Lusa) – A China rejeitou hoje a oferta de mediação americana em conversações com o Japão sobre as ilhas Diaoyu, ou Sekaku em japonês, localizadas no Mar da China, classificando de “muito errada” a tentativa de Washington de envolvimento na questão.

A secretária de Estado norte-americana, Hillary Clinton, ofereceu recentemente a ajuda de Washington para conversações a três, no que considerou ser uma tentativa para ajudar ao desanuviamento da tensão sino-japonesa depois de as relações entre as duas potências asiáticas terem caído ao nível mais baixo dos últimos cinco anos.

O porta-voz do Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros chinês disse em comunicado que a ideia de realizar conversações trilaterais tinha sido dos Estados Unidos, mas a questão continua a dever ser tratada apenas pelos dois países.

Ma Zhaoxu salientou também ser “muito errada” a posição de Washington de considerar as ilhas no espaço do acordo de segurança entre americanos e japoneses e exigiu aos Estados Unidos uma correção da posição que assumiu.

O porta-voz estaria a responder a afirmações feitas por Hillari Clinton ao ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros japonês de que as ilhas estavam cobertas no pacto americano/japonês de segurança, o que obriga os Estados Unidos a responder a qualquer ataque, mesmo que em solo nipónico.

A tensão entre japoneses e chineses subiu de tom em setembro, quando patrulhas nipónicas apresaram um navio de pesca chinês junto às ilhas Diaoyu, tendo mantido o comandante da embarcação detido cerca de duas semanas.

Além do Japão e da China, também Taiwan reclama as ilhas Diaoyu, desertas e alvo de disputa desde que foram conhecidas as suas reservas de petróleo e gás na década de 1970.

JCS.

*** Este texto foi escrito ao abrigo do novo Acordo Ortográfico ***
http://www.lusa.pt/lusaweb/user/showite ... d=11714512

[Boss]

Claro que os EUA iam botar o dedo ali para ajudar o capacho deles.

[marcelo l.]

China’s Growing Strength, Taiwan's Diminishing Options
http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2010/11 ... _wang.aspx


In the third installment of the Taiwan-U.S. Quarterly Analysis, Yuan-kang Wang explains why, despite the improved atmosphere in cross-strait relations, strong Taiwan-U.S. military ties are important and can serve as a hedge against a change in Chinese intentions in the future.



As China grows stronger, its weight is felt increasingly around the world. In particular, China's growing military, economic, and political capabilities are limiting strategic options for Taiwan, whose main security threat comes from the mainland. Strengthening Taiwan-U.S. relations can help the island better protect its security.

The Taiwan Strait, often considered one of the most dangerous flashpoints in international politics, appears stable at present. The last crisis took place some fifteen years ago in 1995-96, when China launched missiles which landed off Taiwan's coast in an attempt to intimidate politicians and voters and sway the island’s presidential election. Cross-strait relations have improved significantly since President Ma Ying-jeou took office in 2008. The two sides have signed a series of agreements on direct flights, financial cooperation, crime fighting, tourism promotion, and reduction of trade barriers. People-to-people contacts have intensified and economic links have strengthened. Beijing ceased to actively oppose Taiwan’s participation in some international organizations that do not require statehood for membership, such as the World Health Assembly. The infamous “checkbook diplomacy” in which each side tried to outbid the other in stealing diplomatic partners has been put on hold, replaced by a tacit “diplomatic truce.”

In Beijing, the Hu Jintao leadership has shown remarkable skill in dealing with Taiwan. Hu and other Chinese officials seemed to realize that the hardball tactics and harsh rhetoric of the past had driven Taiwan further away from China. To remedy this, they embarked upon a “hearts and minds” strategy aiming to win over Taiwan's voters. The focus of this new strategy was on preventing Taiwan from drifting toward independence. Beijing muted the unpopular “one country, two systems” formula for unification and avoided reminding Taiwan that the use of force to deter independence or compel unification was still an option. To bring the island closer, Chinese leaders promised the benefits of closer economic, cultural, educational, and other ties for the Taiwanese people. For instance, Beijing opened the mainland market to agricultural products from southern Taiwan, an area traditionally unfriendly toward China; mainland universities meted out preferential treatment to Taiwanese students; academic scholars from both sides regularly held joint conferences; Taiwanese businesses received low-cost loans for investing on the mainland; daily direct cross-Strait flights helped revitalize Taiwan’s ailing airline industry and airports; and the influx of mainland tourists provided tangible gains to Taiwan's domestic economy.

Enhanced military coercive capabilities

Despite the thawing of cross-Strait tensions, China passed an Anti-secession Law in 2005 and continues to deploy missiles targeted at Taiwan. The Pentagon’s 2010 annual report on Chinese military power estimates that China has deployed between 1,050 and 1,150 short-range ballistic missiles,[1] the same number as last year. This apparent pause, however, runs counter to China's deployment of cruise missiles, which has increased by roughly 100 over the last year, totaling between 200 and 500. Quantity aside, the quality and accuracy of China’s missiles have consistently improved, thus enhancing Beijing’s coercive capabilities against the island.[2] Even more worrisome is China’s naval buildup that increases its anti-access and area-denial capabilities. The Chinese navy now boasts the largest force of principal combatants, submarines, and amphibious warships in Asia. The PLA Navy has constructed a new naval base on Hainan Island and has shown substantial interest in building aircraft carriers. Growing Chinese seapower can be used to deny foreign access to the “first island chain” off the East Asian mainland, which includes Taiwan. Overall, the 2010 Pentagon report reiterates the conclusion of past years that the balance of military forces in the Taiwan Strait continues to shift in China's favor. Beijing’s sustained military buildup opposite Taiwan and its refusal to renounce the use of force demonstrate the high value it places on the utility of coercion in achieving unification. The fact that China is acquiring these capabilities does not mean it will necessarily use them; but it certainly creates unprecedented opportunities to do so. It seems that, in Beijing’s calculation, fear of war with the powerful mainland is the best deterrent against Taiwan independence. Polls in Taiwan suggest that an overwhelming majority would choose independence if it would not cause a war with China.[3]

But China’s military buildup opposite Taiwan strikes an inharmonious chord in the ongoing cross-Strait rapprochement. Contrary to China’s overarching strategy, the buildup is not winning the hearts and minds of the Taiwanese people. It also makes military confidence-building measures, which would be a major accomplishment in further stabilizing the situation, even more difficult, given the lack of trust between the two militaries.

The shifting cross-Strait military balance in China’s favor has negative consequences for Taiwan’s security. First, though unlikely at present, should Beijing decide to use military coercion in the future, Taiwan could be forced to sacrifice its interests and accommodate Beijing's demands. Second, China's increased anti-access and area-denial capabilities could delay or frustrate U.S. attempts to support Taiwan in case of conflict, raising the costs of U.S. intervention. Taiwan's heightened sense of vulnerability and the increased uncertainty of U.S. support have the effect of reducing the island’s bargaining power with the mainland. In addition, China's overall military rise might lead Taiwan’s allies to question the necessity of support. For instance, U.S. Senator Arlen Specter, describing Taiwan as “an irritant to mainland China,” suggested that Washington should revise its arms sale policy to Taiwan because even a reasonable increase in armaments sold to Taiwan “would not be sufficient to stem the tide” if China decided to invade the island.[4] The rising difficulty of defending against a mainland attack is likely to raise doubt about the utility of coming to Taiwan's defense. Compounding the problem is the decline in Taiwan’s defense budget as a percentage of GDP over the years, leading some analysts to question Taiwan's determination to defend itself.

A reassessment of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, however, would have tremendous implications for Taiwan’s security. Over the decades, U.S. support has been the indispensible factor for the survival of the island. The U.S.-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty, in effect from 1954 to 1980, provided an alliance that guaranteed Taiwan’s security. U.S.-Taiwan security relations continued after Washington switched diplomatic recognition to Beijing, and sustained arms sales to Taiwan helped strengthen the island's defense. The Taiwan Relations Act, enacted by U.S. Congress in 1979, stipulates that “the United States will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.” The arms sales, in addition to strengthening Taiwan’s defense, also indicate the level of political support from Washington. Beijing sought to restrict U.S. arms sale to Taiwan in the August 17, 1982 Communiqué. But before he formally agreed to the communiqué, President Reagan secretly sent an envoy to deliver what became known as the Six Assurances to Taipei affirming that Washington would not “set a date for ending arms sales to Taiwan.”[5] The pledge not to set a termination date, however, may be meaningless if Washington does not sell Taiwan the equipment that it needs.

Rising economic might

In 2010, China officially surpassed Japan as the world's second largest economy, after the United States. China has become the largest trading partner of many countries in the world; in South Korea, trade with China is larger than the country's trade with Japan and the United States combined. China is now ASEAN’s largest trading partner, bolstered by a free trade agreement. Chinese investments in Africa, Latin America and other parts of the world are gradually changing the international landscape. The Chinese model of development—economic liberalization with tight political control—has a certain appeal to autocrats of the world, as it provides an alternative to the Western model. The size of the Chinese economy has made it one of the key economic locomotives in the world. China quickly emerged from the economic slump following the 2008 global financial crisis, growing at 8.7 percent in 2009, and played a pivotal role in pulling the world economy out of the recession.

As Taiwan’s economy faced rising employment and sluggish growth in much of the first decade of the 21st century, the economic opportunity presented by China had a magnet effect on the island. Taiwanese businesses have invested heavily in China, and more than half a million Taiwanese people now live there permanently. Nonetheless, as East Asian countries pursued free trade agreements with each other, there were concerns that Taiwan risked being marginalized in the movement toward the region's economic integration. The China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement, which went into effect on January 1, 2010, expedited Taiwan's decision to negotiate the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) with China. For its part, Beijing hoped to use the lure of economic benefits to tie the island closer to the mainland. In the agreement signed on June 29, 2010 in the Chinese city of Chongqing, the “early harvest” list of tariff concessions covered 539 Taiwanese products, valued at $13.8 billion, and 267 mainland Chinese products, valued at $2.9 billion. Taipei hopes that the ECFA will help Taiwan negotiate free trade agreements with other countries. Of late, Singapore has shown interest in such an agreement.

Beijing’s strategy for engaging Taiwan’s leaders is to start with the supposedly easier area of economic issues, hoping that the benefits of economic integration will lead to political negotiation on the future status of Taiwan. The dynamics of Taiwan’s domestic politics, however, complicates the matter. The opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) views the ECFA with suspicion, worrying that the trade deal will push Taiwan into China's orbit and make the island vulnerable to economic coercion. The ruling KMT party, on the other hand, argues that the ECFA will help revitalize Taiwan's sluggish economy and avoid being marginalized in the economic activities of East Asia. The dynamics of “Blue” and “Green” politics will likely create gridlock and constrain any movement toward cross-Strait political talks. Today, no leader in Taiwan can start political negotiations with China without first forming a consensus among the Taiwanese voters.

China’s rising economic capabilities also give Beijing extra leverage in its dealings with other countries, though it is not always used wisely. The recent fracas over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, where a Chinese fishing trawler collided with a Japanese patrol boat, is a case in point. Beijing reacted angrily to the arrest of the Chinese captain, issuing a series of official denunciations. More importantly, China suspended shipment of rare earth minerals to Japan. Even when the Japanese government appeared to back down and released the captain, Beijing upped the ante by demanding an apology. Beijing’s hard-line tactics sent shockwaves throughout the region, prompting a rethinking of China's role in Asia.

Increased diplomatic leverage

As a rising great power, China enjoys considerable diplomatic leverage in the world and is sought after as a partner in conflict management, climate change mitigation, economic cooperation, and other world affairs. On the Korean peninsula, China, the largest supplier of North Korea's energy, was the host and a crucial actor in the Six-Party Talks attempting to denuclearize the country. In the Middle East, China is a key player in the international effort to monitor and to impose sanctions on Iran for its nuclear program. China is now an active participant in the G-20 summit meetings of leading economies. In the 2009 Copenhagen summit on global climate change, China illustrated how it can use its clout to counter initiatives of the U.S. and other countries as it helped derail a tougher accord to limit greenhouse gas emissions.

On the Taiwan issue, Beijing has successfully made most countries accept, recognize, or acknowledge its “one-China” position. Today only 23 out of the 194 countries in the world recognize the Republic of China on Taiwan. China is a permanent member of the UN Security Council and in the past Beijing has used its veto power to block, or threaten to block, UN peacekeeping operations in Haiti (1996), Guatemala (1997), and Macedonia (1999), ostensibly because of their diplomatic relations with Taiwan (Macedonia severed diplomatic ties with Taipei in 2000). Pressures and threats from Beijing force many countries not to have official contact with Taiwan and to oppose the island’s participation in international institutions. At one point, European officials commented that they would welcome Taiwan's participation in international organizations once Beijing dropped its opposition.[6] This international deference to Beijing's position on cross-strait issues reflects the power asymmetry between China and Taiwan: in most cases, the benefits of deferring to Beijing far outweigh the costs of shunning Taiwan.

As a result, there is a high correlation between Chinese acquiescence and Taiwan’s international space. When the DPP was in power from 2000 to 2008, disagreement over the “One China” position prevented both sides from negotiating, and China blocked Taiwan’s international activities. When the KMT came to power in 2008, the spirit of the “1992 Consensus” allowed China and Taiwan to resume dialogue, based on the tacit understanding that neither side would publicly challenge the other’s interpretation of what “One China” means. To maintain the momentum of reconciliation, Beijing relaxed its opposition to Taiwan’s participation in some international organizations that do not require statehood for membership. The risk for Taiwan, however, is that because of the cross-Strait power asymmetry, Beijing can easily take back what it gives out. Intentions can change.

Implications for Taiwan-U.S. relations

Recently, China has struck a more assertive tone in its foreign policy. The call to replace the dollar as the international reserve currency, Chinese resistance to a tougher climate change accord in Copenhagen, the reassertion of Chinese sovereignty in the South China Sea, and the hardball tactics against Japan in the East China Sea are all indications of an increasingly assertive China on the world stage. China had kept a low profile when it needed a stable international environment to accumulate economic and military power. Now, with the world's second largest economy and increased military capabilities, China is in a better position to pursue its foreign policy interests.

China’s growing military, economic, and political capabilities make it ever more important for Taiwan to strengthen its relations with the United States. As the weaker power in cross-Strait relations, it makes good strategic sense for Taiwan to have the support of Washington in case Beijing changes its intentions. In truth, Taiwan cannot rest its security on the goodwill of China. Taiwan needs allies. To deter China and to preserve Taiwan’s political autonomy and survival, Taiwan must strengthen its self-defense capabilities. In the midst of cross-Strait dialogues, Taiwan should negotiate from a position of strength rather than from a position of weakness. With strengthened defense capabilities, Taiwan would more likely get favorable terms in cross-Strait negotiations and not be forced to accommodate Beijing’s demands. In early 2010, the Obama administration authorized a $6.4 billion arms sale to Taiwan. As the cross-Strait military balance continues to shift in Beijing's favor, the arms sale can help Taiwan beef up its defense and boost confidence on the island. There is still room for growth in Taiwan-U.S. military exchanges and defense cooperation. Building strong military to military ties with the United States is the best hedge against a change in Chinese intentions in the future.

[1] Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2010,” U.S. Department of Defense Annual Report to Congress, (August 2010).

[2] Richard Bush, “Taiwan Faces Growing Threat: Communist China Undermines Rapprochement,” The Washington Times (September 8, 2010).

[3] Brett V. Benson and Emerson M. S. Niou, “Public Opinion, Foreign Policy, and the Security Balance in the Taiwan Strait,” Security Studies 14, no. 2 (April-June 2005): 274-289.

[4] William Lowther, “US Senator Not Convinced on F-16 Bid,” Taipei Times (September 23, 2010).

[5] Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2009), 148.

[6] Dennis V. Hickey, “Beijing’s Evolving Policy toward Taipei: Engagement or Entrapment,” Issues & Studies 45, no. 1 (March 2009): 31-70 at 48.

[cabeça de martelo]

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-11818840

Parece que tanto os Indianos como os Chineses estão a aumentar o dispositivo militar ao pé da fronteira...

[Nibelhein]

E a China continua com seu teste de provocação, ela ta igual a CN com a CS, vendo até aonde o Japão morde, depois ainda tenta botar a culpa no Japão quando alguma coisa acontece...

Japan spots Chinese vessels near disputed islands

TOKYO (*******) - The Japanese coast guard has spotted two Chinese vessels attempting on Sunday to enter waters near islands in the East China Sea that are disputed by the two countries, Kyodo News reported.

Two Chinese fishing patrol ships were sighted around 7:45 a.m. on Sunday (10:45 p.m. British time on Saturday) repeatedly trying to enter waters 44 kilometres off a group of islands known as Senkaku in Japan and Diaoyu in China, Kyodo reported, citing the Japanese coast guard.

[FOXTROT]

A China pode provocar que tem como segurar, já o Japão, deveria parar com esses chiliques pontuais contra a CN, ele sim só tem a perder, nada a ganhar com a CN.

Saudações

[Nibelhein]

A China pode provocar que tem como segurar, já o Japão, deveria parar com esses chiliques pontuais contra a CN, ele sim só tem a perder, nada a ganhar com a CN.

Saudações

Chiliques porque tem outro país invadindo suas águas territoriais? Que a China então pare de dar chilique quanto os Nimitz vão fazer treinamento das águas territóriais dos seus aliados Sul Coreanos que a China não tem nada o que se meter ali.

[FoxTroop]

A China pode provocar que tem como segurar, já o Japão, deveria parar com esses chiliques pontuais contra a CN, ele sim só tem a perder, nada a ganhar com a CN.

Saudações

Chiliques porque tem outro país invadindo suas águas territoriais? Que a China então pare de dar chilique quanto os Nimitz vão fazer treinamento das águas territóriais dos seus aliados Sul Coreanos que a China não tem nada o que se meter ali.

100% de acordo. Não se pode andar a apontar o dedo a porta-aviões junto ás suas águas quando se anda a invadir águas que são clara e indiscutivelmente japonesas. Considero que, neste caso, os USA estão certos em avisar que o pacto USA-Japão abranje todo o território japonês com essas ilhas incluidas.

[Nibelhein]

Chiliques porque tem outro país invadindo suas águas territoriais? Que a China então pare de dar chilique quanto os Nimitz vão fazer treinamento das águas territóriais dos seus aliados Sul Coreanos que a China não tem nada o que se meter ali.

100% de acordo. Não se pode andar a apontar o dedo a porta-aviões junto ás suas águas quando se anda a invadir águas que são clara e indiscutivelmente japonesas. Considero que, neste caso, os USA estão certos em avisar que o pacto USA-Japão abranje todo o território japonês com essas ilhas incluidas.

Pois é, pior ainda é que defendem a China, mas se fosse os EUA fazendo a mesma coisa seria criticado

[FOXTROT]

Ops, acredito que os caros colegas me interpretaram errado, me refiro aos chiliques do Japão contra a C. do Norte, salvo o disparo de um míssil em 1998 que sobrevou o território japa, não me recordo de outra porovacação oriunda da CN.

Quanto aos conflitos sino-japoneses deve-se em grande parte ao resentimento pela ocupação japa na 2º WW, hoje a China é uma potência militar enquanto os japas capacho de yanques.

Saudações